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Mandatory Process 
MATTHEW J.B. LAWRENCE* 
This Article suggests that people tend to undervalue their procedural rights—their 
proverbial “day in court”—until they are actually involved in a dispute. The Article 
argues that the inherent, outcome-independent value of participating in a dispute 
resolution process comes largely from its power to soothe a person’s grievance—
their perception of unfairness and accompanying negative emotional reaction—win 
or lose. But a tendency to assume unchanging emotional states, known in behavioral 
economics as projection bias, can prevent people from anticipating that they might 
become aggrieved and from appreciating the grievance-soothing power of process. 
When this happens, people will waive their procedural rights too freely. 
This conclusion undermines the freedom-of-contract rationale for trusting parties 
to make their own pre-dispute choices about the availability of dispute resolution 
process. Contributing to the second, more paternalistic wave of “hard” behavioral 
economics (recommending mandates, not nudges), this Article identifies 
circumstances under which the threat of behavioral market failure justifies a law 
mandating the procedural protections that people must “buy” before a dispute 
arises, whether they want to or not. 
This behavioral approach to understanding the value of process and when it 
should be mandatory has implications throughout the law. This Article shows how 
the behavioral approach leads to specific interventions for mandatory process in 
health insurance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the constitutional right to 
due process, and Medicare contractor agreements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, a patient whose health insurer refused to cover some treatment or 
service—say in vitro fertilization, gastric bypass, a CAT scan, or anything else—had little 
recourse to challenge that decision. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) had taken away but not replaced state courts’ common law authority to 
second-guess such utilization review decisions, which left patients “unprotected.”1 Court 
after court lamented this problematic state of affairs and called on Congress to fix it.2 
Eventually, though, states started to address this gap by mandating that insurers 
offer disappointed patients access to timely, external, independent review of 
decisions denying coverage, at the insurer’s expense.3 The Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) extended this patchwork throughout the land, mandating that every private 
insurance plan in every state offer such an external review process.4 In health 
insurance, process is now mandatory. 
By most accounts this is a happy ending,5 but there is something missing from 
this story. If procedural rights were and are so valuable to patients, why did states 
(and eventually Congress) have to step in to get them those rights? Why didn’t the 
health insurance contract simply provide for them? Why were courts so quick to 
assume (apparently correctly) that the common law process rights taken away by 
ERISA could be replaced only by state or federal mandate, and not by contract?  
This puzzle invites a larger question: When should the law regulate process by 
mandate? The question arises again and again throughout the law: in civil procedure,6 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 62 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 2. Id.; e.g. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (“I also join ‘the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit 
what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.’” (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare, 346 U.S. 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)). 
 3. See generally Katherine T. Vukadin, Hope or Hype: Why the Affordable Care Act’s 
New External Review Rules for Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60 
BUFF. L. REV 1201 (2012). 
 4. Id. at 1203. 
 5. See id.; see also Dustin D. Berger, The Management of Health Care Costs: 
Independent Medical Review After “ObamaCare”, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 255 (2011); Roy F. 
Harmon, An Assessment of New Appeals and External Review Processes—ERISA Claimants 
Get “Some Kind of a Hearing,” 56 S.D. L. REV. 408 (2011); Eleanor D. Kinney, 
Administrative Law Protections in Coverage Expansions for Consumers Under Health 
Reform, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 60–64 (2011) (discussing procedures). 
 6. E.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342–52 (2012) (discussing current law on enforcement of 
agreements to alter rules of procedure in federal and state court); Kevin E. Davis & Helen 
Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 527 (2011) (discussing 
lack of information as a reason to doubt that choice about procedure reflects best interest of 
parties); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 734–
38 (2011) (discussing enforcement of procedural contracts in federal court); Judith Resnik, 
Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 613 (2005) (discussing amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that expressly listed facilitating settlement as a goal of 
pretrial conferences). 
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in tort,7 in constitutional law,8 in arbitration law,9 in contract law,10 and elsewhere. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court confronts questions about whether to mandate process 
nearly every term.11 
This Article offers a novel answer to this question, a behavioral approach to 
understanding the inherent value of the “product” that is dispute resolution process 
and whether its “purchase” should be mandatory. Based on research in behavioral 
economics and procedural justice, this approach offers an account of whether and 
when people should be trusted to contract over procedure. Advancing the second 
wave of “hard” behavioral economics that explores when biases justify not “nudges” 
but mandates, the Article identifies the conditions under which the law should 
“mandate process” by dictating the procedures that must be available to resolve a 
dispute, even if both parties agree otherwise before the dispute arises. 
Here is a précis of the behavioral approach offered in this Article, in two steps: 
First, many people confronted with an adverse outcome, like the denial of their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. E.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue 
& Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1227 (2003) (discussing tort reforms 
allowing purchasers of automobile insurance to decide ex ante whether to contract for a full 
right to sue); Antonios P. Tsarouhas, Bowen v. Kil–Kare, Inc.: The Derivative and 
Independent Approach to Spousal Consortium, 19 OH. N. U. L. REV. 987, 994 (1993) (arguing 
that application of waiver of liability to spouse’s consortium claim would “deny the spouse 
her day in court”). 
 8. E.g., Antinore v. State, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (enforcing collective 
bargaining agreement that limited due process rights). 
 9. Compare United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 698 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(writing that due process would not allow parties to “flip a coin” to resolve dispute), with 10 
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/23-27 (West 2010) (mandating that in case of tie, election be resolved 
by lottery), and Norman L. Balmer, An Innovator’s Prospective on Judicial Management in 
the United States, 9 FED. CIR. B. J. 615, 618 (2000) (“[W]e have heard of patent disputes being 
resolved as a wager on a friendly game of golf or a flip of the coin. It is cost effective and it 
quickly eliminates uncertainty.”), and Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in 
Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1444 (2009) (“[F]rom an economic perspective it is preferable 
to resolve an honest dispute over the amount of a debt by a flip of a coin, for this resolution 
minimizes litigation costs with no clear sacrifice on other dimensions of behavior.”), and 
Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(discussing randomized outcomes in the judicial system). 
 10. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); see also Palomar Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 693 F.3d 
1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2012) (allowing no judicial review of reopening determinations); ROBERT 
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
 11. The Supreme Court’s decisions enforcing the contractually-set limitations period in 
Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013), and requiring 
arbitration of the non-compete agreement in Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, 133 S. 
Ct. 500 (2012), are two recent examples. As seen in both those cases and many others, the 
Court tends to rule against mandatory process; that is, it has tended to approve pre-dispute 
agreements regarding parties’ procedural rights, usually by application of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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request for health insurance coverage, accept the outcome, deal with their 
disappointment, and move on. But sometimes a loss sticks, we perceive an outcome 
as unfair, and we “grieve” as a result. The inherent value of participating in a dispute 
resolution process comes in part from its power to soothe such a grievance when it 
does occur, win or lose. The ancient Egyptians knew that “[a] good hearing soothes 
the heart”12; or as Justice Frankfurter put it, due process “generat[es] the feeling, so 
important to a popular government, that justice has been done.”13 More recently, 
Tom Tyler and others have offered experimental research into procedural justice 
consistent with the power of fair process to generate acceptance even without 
changing outcomes.14 Thus, it may be correct to view process as a commodity, but it 
is a special kind. Its value to us depends on our suffering a grievance—an emotional 
response that can be difficult to predict—and comes not only from satisfying our 
preferences but from altering them.15 
Second, people can fail to appreciate this grievance-soothing value of 
participating in a dispute resolution process until they actually suffer a grievance. 
Research in behavioral economics indicates that people tend to underestimate 
changes in their own emotional states; behavioral economists call this tendency 
“projection bias.”16 Where present, projection bias “mean[s] that people wrongly 
project their current emotional state onto their future selves.”17 (So, for example, a 
hungry shopper assumes she will be hungry when it comes time to eat, and buys too 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. PTTAHOTEP, THE INSTRUCTION OF PTAHHOTEP, quoted in JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE 
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, at vii (1985). 
 13. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 14. E.g., Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science 
Perspective on Civil Procedural Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997). 
 15. As a result, dispute resolution process is better understood as belonging to a special 
category of preference-altering commodities, such as addictive drugs or gastric bypass 
surgery. Instead of generating addiction (as with drugs) or satiation (as with gastric bypass), 
dispute resolution generates acceptance. 
 16. George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in 
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 1209, 1211–12 (2003) (“We believe that 
projection bias is important for many economic applications, and that it can provide an 
intuitive and parsimonious account for many phenomena that are otherwise difficult to 
explain.”) [hereinafter Lowenstein et al., Projection Bias]; see also George Loewenstein 
& Erik Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION 351, 
353 (George Loewenstien et al., eds., 2003). 
 17. Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 323 
(2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Willingness]. The term “projection bias” has not always been 
used consistently since the label was offered by Loewenstein. On occasion, it has been used 
to imply simply that people do not correctly forecast how they will feel about things, regardless 
of whether the reason for such an error is their failure to anticipate an altered preference state 
or some other cause. This broader possibility is known as “affective forecasting,” a general 
term that includes several biases, of which projection bias is one. Id. at 305; see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 
1831 (2013). The term “projection bias” is used here in the more narrow sense in which 
Loewenstein (and Sunstein) employed it, that is, a failure to correctly forecast changes in one’s 
own emotional state. See infra notes 103–108 and accompanying text. 
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much food.) A person susceptible to projection bias, then, will underestimate the 
value of participating in a dispute resolution process ex ante, either by failing to 
appreciate that she may come to suffer a grievance (it is one thing to be subjected to 
a loss, quite another to suffer a grievance) or by failing to appreciate the 
grievance-soothing power of process. Either way, she will contract for too little 
process, potentially justifying a mandate.18 
A stylized example of the behavioral approach at work: Imagine a tenant subject 
to projection bias negotiating over the terms of a lease. At this point, she will fail to 
appreciate that she could come to despise her landlord for, say, raising her rent. She 
will also fail to anticipate that, should she suffer such a grievance, pursuing a dispute 
resolution process like mediation or housing court could ease her bitterness, whether 
she gets her rent lowered or not. As a result, she will undervalue her procedural rights 
at the time she signs her lease and it may, under circumstances discussed in the 
Article, be appropriate for the law to mandate the dispute resolution process that 
governs her dispute rather than leave that question for the landlord and tenant to 
decide in the lease. 
This Article is the first to apply behavioral economic tools to model the inherent 
value of dispute resolution process or to analyze the “market” therefor. The resulting 
behavioral approach to the value of the “day in court” and the desirability of 
mandatory process is the Article’s primary contribution. 
The Article also makes three additional, secondary contributions. First, this 
Article is one of the first to explore the implications of projection bias for the design 
of legal rules. Unlike optimism, the availability heuristic, and other biases also 
revealed by research in behavioral economics, projection bias has with limited 
exception not found its way into behavioral law and economics; indeed Cass Sunstein 
has said that “it is not clear how or whether public officials should react to the 
possibility of projection bias.”19 One reason that scholars in behavioral law and 
economics have so far been hesitant to explore the implications of projection bias 
may be that, unlike many other biases, it can be especially difficult to fix a behavioral 
market failure that is caused by projection bias with a choice-respecting “nudge” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Just as behavioral economics might justify a prohibition on the purchase of addictive 
drugs because people fail to anticipate the adverse alteration to their preferences such drugs 
can cause, Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 1211 (“A stressed undergraduate who 
underappreciates the addictiveness of cigarettes . . . might start smoking with the plan of 
quitting upon graduation, only to continue smoking after graduation once she becomes 
addicted.”), the law should in many situations mandate the purchase of process because people 
fail to anticipate the benign alteration caused by the right to a “day in court.” The commodities 
and effects may be very different, but the behavioral bias that creates market failure—and 
justifies a restriction on choice—is not. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. Sunstein, Willingness, supra note 17, at 324. The primary exception is arguments 
about the usefulness of “cooling off” periods. See generally Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 
1238–40. Such inquiries address projection bias only to the extent that it prevents a person in 
a “hot” state from predicting that they might cool down, not to the extent that it prevents a 
person in a “cool” state from predicting that they might enter a “hot” state. See infra note 109 
and accompanying text. 
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such as a disclosure rule or default rule, making a liberty-respecting (and so 
unobjectionable) policy fix difficult.20 
Second, and relatedly, Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes note in their article, How 
Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, that behavioral economic research 
is capable of supporting more forceful interventions than those recommended by the 
first wave of behavioral law and economics.21 This Article advances the second, hard 
wave of behavioral law and economic scholarship called for by Bubb and Pildes, 
going “beyond nudges” to explore in a particular and especially important context 
the degree to which behavioral biases support a mandatory rule.22 Process mandates 
are not as normatively problematic as ordinary mandates, the Article points out, 
because they are ultimately choice preserving. Process mandates deprive both parties 
of a choice ex ante (to forego process), but offer the aggrieved party a choice ex post 
she would not otherwise have had (to sue). 
Third, the behavioral approach has implications for whether to mandate process 
in specific areas throughout the law. A comprehensive analysis of every potential 
process mandate is beyond the scope of this Article. But the Article engages specific 
interventions in four areas in order to illustrate the usefulness of the behavioral 
approach: (1) the behavioral approach can be used to defend the Affordable Care 
Act’s “process mandate”—the requirement that health insurers offer beneficiaries 
external review of decisions denying coverage—and thereby solve the puzzle that 
opened the Article; (2) we should be especially reluctant to enforce contractual 
agreements altering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that they make 
it harder to bring a case simply because it is likely to lose (such as by raising the 
pleading standard or limiting discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss) 
or to appear in person (such as by forcing the plaintiff to litigate in a distant forum); 
(3) we should be loathe to permit claimants to waive their constitutional rights to due 
process prior to deprivations of “new” property; and (4) Medicare should consider 
requiring the insurers that it does business with to waive their procedural rights. This 
Article offers the first intervention in order to demonstrate how the behavioral 
approach can explain process mandates, the second to situate the behavioral approach 
in a lively literature addressed to mandatory process in civil procedure, the third for 
its constitutional significance, and the fourth to illustrate the capacity of the 
behavioral approach to counsel against mandatory process. 
Part I discusses the features and functions of dispute resolution process, 
understood as a commodity. Part II begins by discussing limitations of the 
proceduralist and economic approaches to understanding the value of process and 
when the predispute “purchase” of this commodity should be mandatory. Part II then 
goes on to offer a conception of the inherent, outcome-independent value of process 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009); see also Camerer et al., supra note 7, at 1239 
(“Cooling-off periods appear more intrusive than our earlier policies, and should thus be 
implemented with much greater reticence and only after careful analysis.”). 
 21. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2014) (“Put simply, it would be surprising if the main policy 
implication of the mounting evidence documenting the failure of individual choice was a turn 
toward regulatory instruments that preserve individual choice.”). 
 22. See id. at 1658. 
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as coming from its capacity to soothe grievances—especially negative emotional 
reactions to adverse events—and identifies projection bias as a behavioral market 
failure that may keep people from appreciating this value of the “day in court” ex 
ante, before suffering a grievance. In short, it shows that behavioral market failure 
could cause people to contract for too few procedural protections. 
Part III explores the conditions under which the possibility that some people may 
fail to value their day in court ex ante actually supports a process mandate. This 
inquiry is necessary for any behavioral economic analysis because our susceptibility 
to behavioral biases is heterogeneous and because mandates come with unavoidable 
costs, so the mere possibility that a behavioral bias is present does not automatically 
counsel in favor of a mandate (or even a nudge). But, Part III shows, the knowledge 
problems that have stood in the way of “hard” behavioral economics are not as 
problematic for process mandates because process mandates are an example of what 
the Article labels choice-preserving mandates, that is, laws that force us to keep our 
options open. Such laws are not unambiguously liberty restricting; they restrict liberty 
ex ante, but increase liberty ex post. This distinction offers an answer to prominent 
functional and welfare-based libertarian objections to government intervention, and so 
puts mandatory process requirements (and other choice-preserving mandates) on a 
stronger normative footing than purely restrictive mandates. 
Part IV discusses implications. Anytime the law might dictate that more (or 
different) process be available for resolving a potential dispute between two parties 
than the parties would set by agreement, the decision whether to do so would benefit 
from consideration of the behavioral approach put forward in this Article. Four 
particular implications for open questions of process policy—about where to 
mandate process, where not to, what process to mandate in federal court, and whether 
to treat the Due Process Clause as a mandate—illustrate the point. Finally, the Article 
ends with a brief Conclusion. 
I. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS AS A COMMODITY 
Commodities can be described by their functions and form, and dispute 
resolution process is no different (although, as this Article will show, dispute 
resolution is no ordinary commodity).23 This Part briefly describes the essential 
and optional features of dispute resolution process, as well as its functions. This 
discussion sets the stage for the discussion in the next two Parts of how to 
understand the value of process and the behavioral case for forcing people to “buy” 
procedural protections that they do not want. 
As used here, dispute resolution process (or just “process”) means any mechanism 
by which a party aggrieved by a decision may air his or her grievance after the fact 
and, perhaps, obtain reversal or some other relief. So, broadly understood, the 
irreducible features of dispute resolution process are (1) claimant participation and 
(2) some possibility of relief, often either reversal or compensation.24 Remedial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Cf. Tom Ginsburg, 2013 Coase Lecture, Constitutions as Products, UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/audio/ginsburg021213 
(analyzing constitutions in light of their features and useful functions). 
 24. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 
(1978) (discussing participation and review by a decision maker as essential features of 
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processes fitting this description are everywhere, from the process your credit card 
company offers for you to dispute charges, to the NFL’s instant replay system (before 
the final two minutes, when a different review mechanism is used), to the 
adjudication of a constitutional case in federal court.25 
This definition contrasts dispute resolution process with other mechanisms by 
which parties might agree to enforce their rights or provide relief vis à vis one 
another. For example, cases might be identified or brought by third-party 
investigators, not individual parties (even if each party has a significant stake in the 
prosecution and outcome).26 Similarly, in some cases, parties (including a third 
party) could use random sampling of cases, auditing, process controls, or other forms 
of oversight—other than individual, claimant-driven appeals—to prevent or identify 
incorrect decisions or inappropriate behavior.27 Or a right to sue might be given to 
anyone, not just the aggrieved party, as is the case in qui tam lawsuits.28 
Dispute resolution process may feature a variety of additional, optional features. 
These include: (1) an adversarial proceeding (involving not only the aggrieved but 
the party with whose decision the aggrieved takes issue)29; (2) taking of evidence or 
building of a record including, perhaps, the disclosure of information (to the parties 
or the public)30; (3) ritual (such as the judge’s robes)31; (4) adjudicator independence 
(in some cases the adjudicator is the initial decider, while in others, such as federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
adjudication that distinguish it from other means of decision making); Bruce L. Hay, 
Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1997) (noting two 
effects of adjudication, a “sorting effect” flowing from the possibility of reversal and a 
“process effect[]” flowing from participation by the aggrieved).  
 25. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Replay, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1683 (2011). 
 26. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
OEI-04-11-00680, MEDICARE RECOVERY AUDIT CONTRACTORS AND CMS’S ACTIONS TO 
ADDRESS IMPROPER PAYMENTS, REFERRALS OF POTENTIAL FRAUD, AND PERFORMANCE 
(2013) (describing program incentivizing third-party contractors to pursue Medicare 
appeals on behalf of government). 
 27. See, e.g., Palomar Medical Center v. Sebelius, 693 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(holding there was “nothing arbitrary or capricious” about agency’s decision to enforce 
compliance with regulations “internally rather than through provider appeals”); cf. Steven 
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995) 
(discussing conditions under which error correction mechanisms other than ex post appeal are 
more cost effective); Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 
(2000) (presenting model in which optimal design of auditing procedures depends on whether 
errors of initial decision maker are intentional or accidental). See generally William B. 
Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 2129 (2004) (discussing role of claimants in enforcing public goals). 
 28. See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: 
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation under the False Claims Act, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1706–11 (2013) (discussing basics of qui tam lawsuits). 
 29. On inquisitorial versus adversarial systems generally, see, for example, Pauline 
Houlden, Stephen LaTour, Laurens Walker & John Thibaut, Preference for Modes of Dispute 
Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 13 (1978). 
 30. Compare, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (describing on-the-record review of 
administrative agency action), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (governing discovery in federal civil 
proceedings). 
 31. OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL (2005). 
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court, extensive protections are employed to ensure independence)32; (5) reason 
giving by the adjudicator, either oral or in writing, including, perhaps, a system of 
precedent33; and (6) cost shifting. 
As for the functions of dispute resolution process, the most obvious is the 
identification and correction of errors. Simply the threat of reversal can prevent 
errors, and each (correct) reversal corrects an error, thereby increasing 
compliance with the substantive law (whether the law’s source is contract, 
statute, or constitution).34 
Indeed, some who have modeled adjudicatory process have posited that 
encouraging compliance with the law through the prevention and correction of 
noncompliant behaviors is its only valuable function.35 This assumption about the 
function of dispute resolution can be seen in general surveys of law and economics 
offered by prominent scholars in the field.36 It bears noting that, if that is so, the first 
essential feature of adjudicatory process—participation by the aggrieved—is not 
actually necessary. Rather, so viewed, litigant selection and prosecution of cases are 
just one means to the end of enforcement. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III (mandating independence of federal judges). 
 33. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995). 
 34. As used here, an “error” is an outcome different than the legally “correct” one. In tort, 
an “error” occurs when a tort-feasor negligently injures a victim without compensation. In 
contract, an “error” occurs when a party breaches the terms of the contract without paying 
expectation damages to the other party to the contract. 
 35. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994) (suggesting that reported preference for participation may 
reduce to preference for accuracy because accuracy is perceived to be a function of 
participation). But see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 291–97 
(2004) (rejecting this view). See generally Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need 
for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 323 (2008) (discussing this vision of procedure); 
Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 388, 394 (1909) (“[T]he 
end of legal procedure is to bring about results in accord with substantive law.”). 
 36. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 235 (2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he 
social function of the legal system . . . is to provide incentives for individuals to act in certain 
socially desirable ways.”); see also id. at 250 (discussing benefits of ADR focused exclusively 
on information sharing and efficiency). The first example in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2009) of a policy shift that welfare economics would 
support is a shift from the current system of tort liability for automobile accidents, in which 
victims may sue, to a comprehensive compensation system, in which victims could not sue 
but would, on net, be more likely to receive compensation. They say that such a proposal 
would be “deemed socially desirable” on a welfare-based approach simply if it had (1) lower 
administrative costs and (2) more accurate victim compensation. Id. at 1. Their welfare-based 
analysis assumes the only welfare-improving function of tort litigation is error reduction, in 
this case, preventing accidents and compensating victims (to be fair, the project of their book 
is a normative one; it is not intended to be a complete analysis of this or any policy, but their 
framing of the functions of process is nonetheless informative). To be sure, Kaplow and 
Shavell recognize that process may serve functions beyond error reduction, see id. at 275–89 
(outlining functions of process that have been offered in the literature; not including 
grievance-reducing function), but their focus on accuracy is consistent with the focus of most 
economic analyses in the field. 
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Many believe that adjudicatory process serves valuable functions beyond just 
error identification and correction, however.37 Paramount among these is the asserted 
inherent, outcome-independent value of participation—the value of the proverbial 
“day in court.” 
For better or worse, there are nearly as many theories of the value of participation 
as there are proponents of such a value.38 The three most prominent are: (1) 
satisfaction of a “preference for fairness”39; (2) a legitimizing effect, either for the 
court or its decision40; or (3) an autonomy-reaffirming influence that furthers the 
individual dignity of the participant.41 The Parts that follow revisit and expand upon 
the precise nature of this inherent access value. 
II. BEHAVIORAL MARKET FAILURE AND THE DEMAND FOR PROCESS 
Mandates are powerful medicine. Even where a mandate has a salutary effect, 
such benefit may well be outweighed by the myriad side effects that come along with 
any choice-restricting rule. Any mandate takes away people’s freedom of choice, and 
that is something we, as individuals or as a society, may value in itself, for a variety 
of reasons.42 Furthermore, we generally assume that what people choose is more 
efficient than what we mandate, because people are better positioned than 
policymakers to know what they want.43 
This Part for the first time explores the behavioral economics of mandatory 
process requirements—which prevent people from making their own pre-dispute 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Bone, supra note 35, at 337–39 (“For many proceduralists, outcome quality is not the 
only thing that matters in civil adjudication.”). 
 38. Id. (“There are several different approaches to defining the participation right, but 
each has serious difficulties.”); Solum, supra note 35, at 244–73 (discussing three theories of 
procedural justice: the accuracy model, the balancing model, and the participation model). 
 39. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 36; Bone, supra note 35, at 337 (stating the theory 
that the intrinistic value of participation is its “tendency to make a party feel that she has been 
treated fairly by the process and the outcome”); see also David Rosenberg, Individual Justice 
and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 
(1996); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Rationing 47–50 (Olin 
Discussion Paper No. 285) (writing that litigant may “derive moral satisfaction from the fact 
that the quality of his case is being recognized”). 
 40. Solum, supra note 35, at 189 (“If the system is seen as illegitimate or without 
authority, then the system may fail.”); see also Bone, supra note 35, at 338.  
 41. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 12; Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, 
Procedural Due Process and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation 
Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1880 (2000) (theorizing the day-in-court value as 
reflecting “society’s democratic commitment to the precept of process-based autonomy,” with a 
value that is “extremely high but not absolute”); see also Bone, supra note 35, at 338. 
 42. Bone, supra note 35, at 1357–59 (discussing autonomy value as a reason to defer to 
party’s choices about process); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law 
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1033, 1068–74 (2012). 
 43. Bone, supra note 35, at 1355–57 (discussing presumed efficiency benefits of allowing 
parties to tailor process by agreement); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 531; Dodge, supra 
note 6, at 725. 
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choices about their post-dispute procedural rights—in two senses. First, subpart A 
surveys normative arguments in favor of process mandates, relying on the framework 
that has been developed in normative behavioral economic scholarship for evaluating 
regulations that are based upon their capacity to respect choice (and so “treat” only 
those who are subject to bias).44 This survey shows that few arguments have been 
advanced that actually support mandating process; most justifications fail actually to 
support either a mandate or a process requirement. Others are highly contingent, 
limited to, for example, process mandates for the adjudication of constitutional 
rights, and therefore are not helpful in evaluating the case for mandatory process 
beyond the limited (even if important) context in which they apply. 
Subpart B then explores the behavioral economics of process mandates in a 
second, descriptive sense. Specifically, it offers a way of understanding the value of 
the “day in court” and identifies behavioral market failures that could theoretically 
prevent people from adequately considering this value ex ante. It does so by drawing 
on qualitative evidence, empirical research on perceptions of procedural justice, and 
behavioral economic research on boundedly-rational decision making. 
A. Economic and Proceduralist Approaches to Mandatory Process 
Process mandates have not escaped scholarly attention. The literature associated 
with “contract and procedure” discusses the set of process mandates governing the 
procedures applicable to disputes adjudicated in federal court,45 and the arbitration 
literature has discussed process mandates dictating minimum conditions for the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses.46 These discussions have produced a number of 
potential reasons that the law should, in certain circumstances, disregard parties’ 
choices about process, that is, reasons that the law should mandate process. 
Such justifications can roughly be grouped into two categories: (1) economic 
justifications, which accept the possibilities that dispute resolution process might 
not be worth its cost and that individuals are theoretically capable of making this 
cost-benefit tradeoff for themselves; and (2) proceduralist justifications, which 
tend to reject these possibilities and focus instead on arguably incommensurable 
values of process. 
This subpart surveys these justifications, paying particular attention to their 
limitations—that is, whether they address mandatory process generally, whether they 
really support a mandate or just a nudge, and so on. For the economic approaches, 
the focus of doing so is not to demonstrate that these justifications are false or utterly 
unable to support a mandatory process requirement under any circumstances. 
Instead, the focus is to show that previously articulated economic justifications for 
mandatory process are of limited applicability and are often poorly positioned to 
justify a process “mandate” rather than a less coercive regulatory response. For the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. This strain of normative behavioral economics is most often associated with regulatory 
instruments viewed to be “asymmetrically paternalistic,” many of which are now commonly 
known as choice-respecting “nudges.”  For convenience, this Article uses that term. 
 45. E.g., Hershkoff & Davis, supra note 6. 
 46. E.g., David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of 
Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723 (2012). 
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proceduralist approaches, the focus is to explore their underlying bases and identify 
their limits as justifications for mandatory process. 
1. The Economic Approach to Mandatory Process 
The economic justifications for mandatory process can further be sorted into 
two categories: those that provide reason to doubt that a party’s choice to go 
without a right to adjudicatory process actually reflects that person’s best interests 
(faulty choice-based justifications), and those that provide reason to doubt that all 
the actual costs and benefits to third parties (or society) of going without process 
are reflected in a party’s correct choice about her own best interests 
(externality-based justifications). 
a. Faulty choice 
Scholars have argued that a person’s choice about dispute resolution process does 
not necessarily reflect her best interests because (1) the chooser may have inadequate 
information and (2) the chooser may have unequal bargaining power,47 especially 
when faced with a take-it-or-leave-it standard form contract of the sort common in 
consumer contracts.48 Neither justification necessarily supports a mandate. 
Inadequate information and information asymmetry can theoretically be 
addressed with a disclosure rule—one type of nudge—rather than a choice-restricting 
mandate. This is the approach to addressing information asymmetry that has been 
offered to solve information problems in credit card contracts, motor vehicle 
purchasing contracts, mortgage contracts, cell phone contracts, and so on.49 (To be 
sure, disclosure has its own limitations.50) Similarly, an imbalance in bargaining 
power created by a standard form contract can be addressed by forcing choice—
forbidding adhesion—rather than mandating the choice preferred by regulators. 
Furthermore, the normative force of these justifications is questionable and highly 
context dependent. A regulation that protects people from their own inadequate 
information discourages learning and future investment in information that might 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. Bone, supra note 6, at 1360–69 (discussing bargaining power objection to enforcing 
parties’ agreements about process, collecting sources); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 
527 (discussing lack of information as a reason to doubt that choice about procedure reflects 
best interest of parties). 
 48. “Concerns about inadequate information are particularly salient when individuals 
enter into standard-form contracts with business enterprises without any reasonable 
opportunity to consult an attorney.” Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 527.  
 49. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining 
Pricing Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 430 (2012); Oren 
Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004). 
 50. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 
(2008) [hereinafter Willis, Against Financial Literacy]; Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and 
the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 
(2006) [hereinafter, Willis, Decisionmaking]; Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education 
Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (2011) (pointing to shortcomings of disclosure) [hereinafter 
Willis, Financial Education].  
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ultimately lead to a more choice-respecting fix.51 Similarly, in a competitive market, 
at least, an adhesive contract may nonetheless adequately reflect consumers’ interests 
even if only a small number of consumers are aware of the terms. 52 The threat of 
exit by even a small number of educated consumers can force a firm to remove an 
abusive or unwanted term from a standard form contract, and these consumers can 
be educated by competitors’ advertising.53 
b. Externalities 
Scholars have pointed to several potential negative and positive externalities that 
may not be reflected in a person’s pre-dispute choice about the availability of dispute 
resolution process.54 When a person’s choice fails to account for such an externality, 
the choice loses its presumptive efficiency.55 The potential negative externalities of 
going without process (or going with less process) that scholars have identified 
include: diminished compliance with the law56; harms to direct third-party 
beneficiaries of the potential lawsuit57; a loss of uniformity in the procedures 
applicable to disputes58; the potential for violence or self-help by a person unable to 
air her grievance; a lost chance for the adjudicator to develop the law through its 
application in resolving a dispute59; and a lost chance for the public to learn about 
any potential dispute through the development, exchange, and public disclosure of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 529 (“[C]oncerns about inadequate or 
asymmetrical information in contracting generally ought to diminish over time as reliance 
upon certain types of procedural boilerplate becomes more commonplace, resulting in changes 
in contracting parties’ knowledge and expectations.”). But see Dodge, supra note 6, at 761–63 
(arguing that learning about procedural terms is unlikely to take place due to, among other 
reasons, the difficulty of anticipating procedure’s impact on enforcement of the substantive 
law and the requirement of legal knowledge to understand many such terms). 
 52. Bone, supra note 6, at 1364 & nn.146–48. 
 53. Id. (reviewing literature). 
 54. E.g., Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and 
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929 (2003) (discussing negative 
externalities as reason to refuse enforcement of medical malpractice exculpatory agreements); 
Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6 (arguing for caution in permitting parties to contract ex ante 
to change rules of civil procedure because decisions made by private parties may have 
“spillovers” that implicate public values); Horton, supra note 46 (discussing negative 
externalities as a reason to prevent contracting over procedure); David L. Noll, Rethinking 
Anti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2012) (pointing to externality of 
regulatory noncompliance, created by diminished incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to act as 
private attorneys general, as a reason courts should refuse to enforce anti-aggregation 
agreements in certain circumstances). 
 55. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 513 (“[P]rivate transactions presumptively 
are efficient only if there are no negative externalities, that is to say, no adverse effects 
on third parties.”). 
 56. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 54; see also Bone, supra note 6, at 1375 n.198. 
 57. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure 
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 511–13 (2007). 
 58. Resnik, supra note 6. 
 59. Bone, supra note 6, at 1377 & n.203. 
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an evidentiary record.60 On the other side of the ledger, one positive externality of 
the choice to forego process is the potential savings to any government-funded 
dispute resolution process of not having to process the potential dispute.61 
These externality-based justifications for mandatory process have three 
limitations. First, as with the faulty-choice based justifications, none necessarily 
supports a mandate. If two parties’ decision to contract around process creates 
externalities, then that decision should theoretically be taxed in order to force 
internalization of such externalities; the parties should not be prohibited from 
contracting around process altogether.62 Hershkoff and Davis’s argument against 
contractual alterations to the rules of civil procedure, for example, is that such 
agreements should not be enforced when the parties’ procedural change implicates 
some public purpose of the procedure system.63 But all else being equal, in such a 
case, the optimal rule would force the parties to internalize the cost of such an 
externality through a Pigouvian tax or other form of payment, not forbid them from 
contracting altogether.64 Otherwise the tail could wag the dog; a small public 
externality might be used to justify prohibiting parties from obtaining potentially 
large private benefits through contract. 
Second, a primary externality-based justification—diminished compliance with 
the law—does not actually support mandatory process. Rather, it supports only a 
mandatory mechanism for ensuring compliance with the law.65 Ex post dispute 
resolution process is only one way to ensure compliance with the law; this end might 
also be sought by training and oversight requirements, periodic auditing, public 
enforcement of, for example, consumer-protection laws, or reputational sanctions.66 
Indeed, ex post process is in many contexts a particularly inefficient error-reduction 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 514, 541–48 (“Among the most important” 
positive externalities created by process “are various kinds of information that help 
policymakers and members of the general public identify and respond to social problems.”); 
David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of 
Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1085, 1104 (2002); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 207 (2006). 
 61. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 23–25 (2010). But see Bone, supra note 6, at 1374. 
 62. For example, parties to arbitration might be required to pay some fraction of any 
resulting judgment (or settlement, depending on the externality at issue) to the public court 
system, and parties waiving rules of civil procedure might be required to pay some fraction of 
any judgment to the court. Or the tax might be imposed as a (very small) flat fee on any 
contract waiving particular procedural rights. The former approach would be easier to 
implement, but the latter would avoid any distortion of litigation choices. 
 63. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6. 
 64. This sort of tax is named for Arthur Cecil Pigou, its best-known proponent. See 
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 2002); see also Alex 
Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523 
(2013) (discussing Pigouvian taxes). 
 65. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to regulatory 
process for ensuring compliance with the law). 
 66. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text; see also Stewart Macaulay, 
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) 
(discussing enforcement through reputational sanctions). 
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mechanism. The externality-based justification for mandatory process does not allow 
for a choice among these regulatory tools, all else being equal, or justify a mandate 
rather than a less-choice-restricting nudge, such as a forced choice among equally 
effective oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, this externality-based justification 
cannot explain common components of mandatory process—like the right to an 
in-person hearing or a written explanation from the decision-maker—except insofar 
as such components improve accuracy, a questionable proposition.67 
Third, these externality-based justifications for certain processes are highly 
contingent and context specific. Several apply only in deciding whether to allow 
parties to opt out of the federal or state court system for resolving disputes (or make 
particular changes to that system), not in deciding whether to mandate process 
generally. For example, precedent is a feature of only a subset of dispute resolution 
processes (primarily courts)68 and whether the lost opportunity to develop precedent 
is in fact a negative externality “depends on one’s theory of adjudication and, in 
particular, on what constitutes a good decision as well as a good decision-making 
process.”69 That is why we usually allow parties to settle a dispute—whether in 
federal court or not—even though doing so deprives the court of the chance to make 
law. Indeed, courts following the “passive virtues” abhor the chance to make 
precedent, doing so only when parties with a genuine dispute insist that they do so.70 
That tendency is at least facially inconsistent with the view that the lost opportunity 
to make precedent is a negative externality that could justify a process mandate. 
2. The Proceduralist Approach to Mandatory Process 
Other scholars argue that adjudicatory process should not be subject to 
consequentialist concerns and that procedural rights should be determined by what 
is “fair” or “just,” not what is in the best interest of the parties (or third parties). 
Sometimes, proceduralist scholars leave the exact nature of this process value 
undefined.71 This has caused some to argue that the underlying intuition simply 
reflects a preference for fairness.72 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Some studies have suggested that in-person credibility determinations are in fact not more 
accurate. See, e.g., Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 
837 (2011) (“[V]isually observing witnesses at best contributes nothing to a credibility 
determination and at worst increases the likelihood that a fact-finder will get it wrong.”). 
 68. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 14502(b) (2012) (administrative procedures for resolving 
military service members’ disputes about promotion decisions featuring no system of 
precedent); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
§ 10101(g) (2010) (procedures for external review of health insurer coverage determination 
featuring no system of precedent). 
 69. Bone, supra note 6, at 1377. 
 70. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
 71. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 228 n.6 (stating that procedure scholars often 
“leave their ideas about fairness implicit”); Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The 
Problem With Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 504–18 
(2003) (“[D]iscussions of fairness in civil procedure are, with only a few exceptions, rather 
thinly developed.”) (internal citations omitted); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 532 
(“[T]he literature does not clearly state what the appropriate criteria of fairness might be.”). 
 72. See Solum, supra note 35, at 265 n.213. But see Bone, supra note 6, at 505–07 
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This lack of clarity does more than open the proceduralist approach up to criticism. 
It also makes it difficult to determine the extent to which this justification supports 
requiring that certain procedures be available even if both parties to the dispute agree 
otherwise ex ante. Yet even the most dogged of proceduralists would surely concede 
that there are some situations in which the law should not mandate process. 
To remedy this lack of clarity, several scholars have set forth a more precise 
definition of the inherent, nonconsequential value of dispute resolution process, 
grounding it in dignity, fairness, or other values. As described in the paragraphs that 
follow, none of the four most prominent efforts offers a completely satisfactory 
account of when the law should mandate process. 
a. Mashaw’s Dignity and Due Process 
In Due Process and the Administrative State, Jerry Mashaw offers “the best 
account of the dignitary value of participatory process,”73 which itself is the 
primary deontological theory.74 As Mashaw sees it, giving a person an opportunity 
to participate in a decision with which she disagrees is essential to preserving the 
autonomy and dignity of that individual. An unfair process creates an affront 
“somehow related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being taken 
seriously as persons.”75 
Standing alone, Mashaw’s individual-dignity-based theory is not actually an 
argument for mandatory process. For that we would need to add to Mashaw’s theory an 
argument that individuals are not capable of valuing their own dignity and autonomy, or 
of assessing the potential impact of procedural rights thereupon, at the time they agree 
to relinquish those rights. The proposition does not speak for itself; if we assume people 
are better than policymakers at judging their desire for goods as impersonal as carrots 
or cars, then surely we should make the very same assumption when it comes to a 
person’s desire for something as profoundly personal as individual dignity. 
As discussed in Part II.B, below, the behavioral approach offered in this Article 
can be understood as providing an economic basis for such an argument. In this 
sense, the behavioral approach integrates the economic approach with Mashaw’s 
version of the proceduralist approach. 
b. Solum’s Participatory Legitimacy Thesis 
Lawrence Solum articulated an oft-cited and carefully-reasoned theory of 
procedural justice specifically in order to counter claims that such a value was, 
                                                                                                                 
 
(arguing against this theory of fairness because (1) “[d]efining fairness in terms of feelings 
collapses fairness into utility” and (2) doing so means that fairness is no more important than 
(and thus, could potentially be outweighed by), people’s preferences for more pedestrian 
commodities like roads and schools). 
 73. Solum, supra note 35, at 262 n.208 (discussing MASHAW, supra note 12). 
 74. For other expressions of this theory, see, for example, Richard B. Saphire, Specifying 
Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 111 (1978). 
 75. MASHAW, supra note 12, at 163. 
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because undefined, illusory.76 His theory is nuanced, but fundamentally based on the 
claim that to obligate a person to comply with a decision with which she disagrees—
to give the decision normative legitimacy—we must give the person a right of 
participation in the process that brings the outcome about.77 In short, participating in 
process makes a losing outcome normatively legitimate even to the loser. 
As Solum notes (in not so many words), there is no essential reason that 
contracting parties could not appreciate this legitimacy-conferring value of 
participation ex ante, and price that value into their decision whether to forego 
process.78 Thus, his theory of the value of process does not necessarily counsel in 
favor of mandatory process.79 In order to determine the extent to which Solum’s 
theory counsels in favor of mandatory process, as with Mashaw’s theory, we need to 
explore how (and whether) people account for the power of process to generate 
legitimacy ex ante. The behavioral approach offered below offers insight into that 
question, but only insofar as bringing a person to be “legitimately bound by 
erroneous decisions,” the conclusion with which Solum is concerned,80 is consistent 
with the “acceptance” value modeled therein. 
c. Bone’s Adjudicatory Legitimacy 
Robert Bone articulates his theory of adjudicatory legitimacy in a self-conscious 
effort to give content to the intuitive concerns that motivate proceduralists to object 
to contracts altering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—one form of process 
mandate—which he calls “party rulemaking.”81 As he puts it, “if party rulemaking is 
to be limited or barred in a wider range of cases, it must be because giving parties 
control over procedure risks jeopardizing the normative legitimacy of 
adjudication.”82 On Bone’s theory, participation by the aggrieved is an essential 
prerequisite to the legitimacy of the adjudicatory process, and therefore essential to 
the functioning of the courts.83 
His view is only a roadblock, however, for agreements that alter, in an 
impermissible fashion, the rules that govern judicial resolution of disputes in state or 
federal court. As Bone recognizes, the adjudicatory legitimacy he sees as essential to 
these institutions is not a prerequisite to the proper functioning of alternative 
mechanisms for resolving disputes (or overseeing compliance). It therefore does not 
counsel against enforcement of a wide range of agreements about process, including 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. Solum, supra note 35, at 191 (arguing that “a right of participation can be justified for 
reasons that are not reducible to either participation’s effect on accuracy or its effect on the 
cost of adjudication”). 
 77. See id. at 274. 
 78. See id. at 303 (“[I]f rational persons are conceived as having an overriding interest in 
having reasons to consider themselves as legitimately bound by erroneous decisions, then they 
will choose participation over accuracy and cost.”). 
 79. Cf. id. at 266 (rejecting preference-satisfaction theory of value of participation 
because it does not make participation an essential, irreducible aspect of adjudicatory process). 
 80. Id. at 303. 
 81. See Bone, supra note 6, at 1331. 
 82. Id. at 1336. 
 83. Id. 
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agreements to arbitrate disputes rather than hear them in federal court, agreements 
about the process that governs administrative procedures, and agreements to go without 
process altogether.84 As a result, Bone’s theory applies (to the extent one finds it 
persuasive) when it comes to deciding whether to allow parties to tailor the process 
available to a dispute they agree to resolve in federal court, but is inapplicable outside 
of that limited context. But participation surely has value outside of federal court. 
d. Dodge’s Symmetrical Theory 
Owen Fiss, in his article Against Settlement, did not specifically address the value 
of process, but he did argue against allowing parties to resolve disputes on their own 
terms to the extent that doing so could undermine the enforcement of substantive 
laws written with full judicial enforcement in mind.85 Jaime Dodge’s “symmetrical 
theory” can be understood as an intellectual heir of that view. Dodge argues that the 
law should refuse to enforce agreements to alter procedures in state or federal court—
in other words, it should mandate process (within these domains)—where doing so 
could undermine the enforcement goals of the substantive law at issue in the 
dispute.86 David Noll has also offered a similar argument specific to agreements to 
waive the option of bringing a dispute by class action.87 
Like Bone’s “adjudicatory legitimacy,” Dodge’s symmetrical theory is not a 
general theory of the value of participation. Instead, it is a theory of the value of 
adjudication in federal or state court as sometimes viewed by legislators. Dodge’s 
theory counsels in favor of mandatory process only where legislators actually 
intend to use litigant-driven lawsuits as the means to enforce the legal right at issue, 
and actually expect such litigation to proceed following the default rules set by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proportion of suits that fall into this subset 
is not clear.88 
More importantly for present purposes, Dodge’s is not essentially an argument 
about deference to parties’ choices about participatory process, it is an argument 
about parties’ choices regarding whether (and how) to enforce their legal rights. 
Therefore, participation is not an essential component of Dodge’s view. Dodge’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Id. at 1354 (“[T]he distinctive feature of adjudication is its commitment to a particular 
form of principled reasoning . . . this commitment is essential to its institutional legitimacy.”). 
 85. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that the legal 
system in the United States is intended to further public values, not private interests of 
disputants; disputants are means to an end). 
 86. See Dodge, supra note 6, at 730–31 (arguing that parties should be prohibited from 
setting procedure by ex ante agreement that would limit or prevent enforcement of 
nonwaivable constitutional, statutory, or procedural requirements). This view is closely related 
to the compliance externality consequentialist justification for mandatory process, but takes as 
its legitimizing force the goals of the substantive law rather than harms to third parties. It 
therefore is included among the nonconsequentialist/deontological justifications for 
mandatory process. 
 87. Noll, supra note 54. 
 88. See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent 
Pleading Threshold to Class Actions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1225, 1247 (2013) (explaining that 
some statutes are not written with any expectation regarding lawsuit rate). 
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view is that parties should not be allowed to agree by contract to enforcement 
mechanisms that would produce less compliance than the default put into the law by 
the legislature. As with the compliance externalities discussed above, this argument 
supports mandating that parties’ choices about enforcement maintain at least as much 
compliance as would the default (or, perhaps, prohibition of agreements that would 
increase enforcement above that baseline)89 but do not support laws mandating that 
parties employ adjudicatory process to obtain that end rather than other nonprocess 
means, such as auditing.90  
B. A Behavioral Approach to Mandatory Process 
This subpart puts forward a behavioral conception of the value of participation 
and points to research in behavioral economics indicating that people tend to 
under-appreciate this value ex ante. The story of this subpart, shorn of details, is not 
complicated. The story has three parts presented, in full, in sections 1, 2, and 3. Here 
is the simple version: 
First, bad things happen to us all the time. Almost always, we simply move on 
with our lives. Either we do not even lament that things might have been better—
think of the last time you had the flu—or we momentarily grieve our loss but quickly 
accept it, like a college-bound student forced to settle for his safety school. 
Sometimes, though, our misfortunes possess us. We see a fault, we perceive an 
unfairness, one that hurts us or our family, and we cannot look away. Our grievance 
can drive us to sue, to gnash our teeth, to divorce, to depression, and to bitterness, 
among other things. Grievances really hurt. That is the first part of the story, 
subsection 1 (The Costs of Grievances). 
Second, having a process available to resolve disputes can reduce grievances. It 
can prevent us from experiencing a grievance, when we assume a bad outcome—
although bad—must be fair because we have the option to appeal it. And it can soothe 
a grievance when just being heard heals, or at least softens, the hurt. That’s section 
2: The Benefits of Process. 
Third, we often do not realize that we could come to suffer a grievance and that 
process could come to play an important role if we do, so we do not value procedural 
protections enough ex ante. As a result, we might happily contract away our right to 
sue, or sue in court, or sue quickly, when the possibility of a loss, let alone a 
grievance, seems far off and farfetched. That’s section 3: Behavioral Economics and 
the Market for Process. 
And so the conclusion, and a new take on when to mandate process: when people 
fail to predict how process might prevent or cure grievances, the law might help by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77–80 (2003) 
(arguing that Congress creates private rights of action under the assumption that lawsuits will 
be brought at the rate that autonomous individuals tend to sue). 
 90. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing alternative means of 
enforcement that could be better able to encourage compliance, under certain circumstances, 
than claimant-driven adjudication); infra Part IV.C. (discussing possibility of ensuring 
accuracy in administrative decision making without giving claimants any process rights). 
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forcing them to buy process even though they think it is not worth it or by setting the 
terms of such process to optimize its grievance-reducing power. 
My goal here is not to demonstrate that behavioral market failure is the only 
possible justification for mandatory process requirements. The contribution here is 
to reconceive, and thereby improve upon, the classical economic approach that 
scholars have applied when analyzing particular process mandates. This effort can 
be understood as partially translating the concerns of proceduralists, like Mashaw, 
into a more nuanced version of the model of the economists. Doing so brings the 
economic and proceduralist approaches into greater alignment. It thereby shows that 
mandatory process requirements can be justified under a broader range of conditions 
than the economic approach would predict, but need not be as universal as the 
proceduralist approach might indicate. 
1. The Costs of Grievances 
In order to assess the demand for dispute resolution process as opposed to other 
means of enforcement, I focus on the feature of such process that distinguishes it 
from other enforcement mechanisms—participation by the aggrieved.91 What sort of 
cost—beyond fixing an error—does participation prevent or what sort of benefit does 
it create? The sorts of losses that are ordinarily prevented by an enforcement 
mechanism—monetary cost or physical injury—are poor candidates; participation is 
not a necessary feature of an enforcement mechanism that addresses such losses.92 
But harm is not always as straightforward as lost wages, or a broken car, or a 
ruined lung. People can be remarkably resilient; research into happiness shows that 
we are in some circumstances capable of rebounding from a debilitating loss of 
wealth or function to be as happy as we were before.93 And research into dispute 
formation shows that we sometimes barely notice that something bad has happened 
to us, even when the law would, if we asked, provide us with hefty compensation.94 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. See supra Part I. 
 92. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 93. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, 
Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013) (discussing research 
into hedonic adaptation). But cf. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: 
What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE L. J. 1509 (2013) (surveying normative hedonic literature and 
questioning conclusions of Bronsteen et al.). 
 94. See PAUL C. WEILER, HOWARD H. HIATT, JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, WILLIAM G. 
JOHNSON, TROYEN A. BRENNAN & LUCIAN L. LEAPE, A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL 
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70 tbl.4.1 (1993) (showing 
that about one in eight negligent injuries led to a legal claim); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort 
Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 448 (1987) (citing studies showing low lawsuit 
rate); M.P. Baumgartner, Social Control in Suburbia, in 2 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF 
SOCIAL CONTROL 79, 82, 93 (Donald Black ed., 1984); Frederick C. Dunbar & Faten Sabry, 
The Propensity to Sue: Why Do People Seek Legal Actions?, 42 BUS. ECON. 31 (2007); Robert 
C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 681–82 (1986); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, 
Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551 
(1984); Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States of America: 
Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. SOC’Y 400 (1991); David M. Studdert, Eric J. 
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Sometimes, however, losses stick. People perceive a loss as an injury, see it as 
someone’s fault, feel wronged, and suffer. Often, they seek to right the wrong by filing a 
lawsuit or appeal, if that route is available. Or they stew. This behavior, here called 
grieving, has long been the focus of scholarly inquiry associated with the “name, blame, 
claim” framework for analyzing the determinants of dispute formation: first, someone 
identifies a harm, next, they blame someone else for it, and last, they file suit.95 
Grievances pose significant welfare costs to those who suffer them. Qualitatively, 
one might look to anecdotes of people whose lives were disrupted, often 
permanently, by a grievance.96 Similarly, quantitative studies lend support to the 
heavy cost of grievances.97 And research on the power of therapy focuses on the 
importance of acceptance.98 
Grievances can impose costs on others too. In the workplace, research shows that 
employees who feel they have been mistreated are less likely to follow rules.99 And 
in the private contractual context, research shows that parties that feel unfairly treated 
will “shade,” that is, take unverifiable steps to reduce the value of performance to the 
one they think wronged them.100 
2. The Benefits of Process 
Dispute resolution process differs from other mechanisms of enforcement by 
reducing grievances in two ways. First, simply having the option of pursuing a dispute 
                                                                                                                 
 
Thomas, Helen R. Burstin, Brett I.W. Zbar, E. John Orav & Troyen A. Brennan., Negligent 
Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250 (2000). 
 95. See Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 
15 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 655, 656 (1980), William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin 
Sarat, The Emergency and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming. . . , 
15 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 631 (1980-81); see also Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance 
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 302 (Cass Sunstein, ed. 2000) (qualitative study of parties to nuisance lawsuits 
showed acrimony, perceived unfairness at play in decision to press claim through appeal, 
declined to bargain after judgment). 
 96. E.g.; M. GREGGORY BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH (2011) (describing in detail one 
woman’s fight to obtain insurance coverage); Joan Savitsky, A Patient Dies, and Then the 
Anguish of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009, at D5 (outlining anecdote of children of a 
deceased patient, “whom I barely knew, were coping with their own complex emotions, which 
I imagined to be grief, very likely anger and frustration, and perhaps misunderstanding. Filing 
a malpractice suit somehow addressed this”). 
 97. E.g. Audrey Freshman, Financial Disaster as a Risk Factor for Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder: Internet Survey of Trauma in Victims of the Madoff Ponzi Scheme,73 HEALTH 
& SOC. WORK 39 (2012) (reporting elevated levels of PTSD and other adverse behavioral 
effects among victims of Bernie Madoff). 
 98. See generally ACCEPTANCE AND MINDFULNESS IN COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR THERAPY 
(James D. Herbert & Evan M. Forman, eds., 2011). 
 99. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 187–91 (1988). 
 100. Yuval Feldman & T.R. Tyler, Mandated Justice: The Potential Promise and Possible 
Pitfalls of Mandating Procedural Justice in the Workplace, 6 REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 
46, 53–63 (2012). 
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resolution process could prevent a grievance from forming in the first place by making 
the underlying decision appear fair—in behavioral terms, a framing effect.101 A person 
might assume that a decision she has the right to challenge is fair where she would have 
assumed the decision was unfair if the law left her no recourse.102 
Second, and more directly, pursuing a process that is perceived to be fair can 
itself soothe a person’s grievance, even if she does not prevail. When someone does 
grieve, navigating a dispute resolution process that she perceives to be fair can ease 
the dissatisfaction she feels with an outcome she initially viewed to be unfair, win 
or lose.103 In other words, navigating a fair process can cure (or at least ease) a 
grievance, regardless of outcome.104 
This grievance-soothing benefit of participation is connected to empirical 
research into procedural justice.105 This body of scholarship has investigated the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Research on medical malpractice claiming rates indicates that the likelihood of a 
grievance there is a function of presentation and whether the doctor apologizes. See Kevin 
Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Before ‘I’ll See You in Court’, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2008, at A1. Furthermore, even alternative systems that allow a patient to feel heard reduce 
claims. The literature on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, similarly, has shown myriad ways that 
legal process can facilitate or hinder recovery from mental illness or have other therapeutic 
effects. David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 
125, 129 (2000). Cf. TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, 
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS AND GENDERED PARTIES 33–65 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust 
a Doctor You Can’t Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2005). 
 102. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public 
Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 12 (2007) (“Although many people never actually go to court, 
believing that they could go to court if they needed to—and that, if they did, they would receive 
consideration—is a key antecedent of trust and confidence in the legal system.” (citing TOM 
R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH, YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A 
DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).)). 
 103. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988) (“What is striking about procedural justice judgments 
is that they also shape the reactions of those who are on the losing side.”); Burke & Leben, 
supra note 102, at 6 (“People are in fact more willing to accept a negative outcome in their 
case if they feel that the decision was arrived at through a fair method.”); Tom R. Tyler, New 
Approaches to Justice in the Light of Virtues and Problems of the Penal System, in SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT OF CRIME 19, 32 (Margit E. Oswald, Steffen Bieneck, Jorg 
Hupfeld-Heinemann, eds., 2009); cf. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-
Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 
23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549 (2007); Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ 
Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal 
Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008). 
 104. Cf. Arthur Pearlstein, Pursuit of Happiness and Resolution of Conflict: An Agenda for 
the Future of ADR, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 215 (2012). 
 105. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 632 (1994) (“Although we consciously chose the individual legal 
changes, we have not entirely comprehended their combined effect. As a consequence, we 
sometimes debate particular features—for example, styles of judging, the virtues and vices of 
discovery, abuses of the legal system, alternatives to litigation, and various docket-speeding 
local experiments—without acknowledging their links to the system as a whole. We need a 
better sense of these connections and a more comprehensive sense of how process functions 
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components of process that affect whether participants come to view it as fair, 
including voice and the behavior of the decision maker.106 These components may 
be optional features of process that affect the degree to which it prevents and soothes 
grievances. 
Understanding the value of dispute resolution process as its capacity to soothe a 
grievance reflects a core intuition about the usefulness of process that may be as old 
as courts themselves. As Justice Frankfurter put it in 1951: “[n]o[] . . . better way 
[has] been found for generating the feeling, so important to popular government, that 
justice has been done.”107 
And Justice Frankfurter himself was not a pioneer in recognizing the power of 
participation to generate acceptance. In his seminal work Due Process in the 
Administrative State, Jerry Mashaw offered support dating back to 2300 BC: 
If you are a man who leads 
Listen calmly to the speech of one who pleads; 
Don’t stop him from purging his body 
Of that which he planned to tell. 
A man in distress wants to pour out his heart 
More than that his case be won. 
About him who stops a plea 
One asks “Why does he reject it?” 
Not all one pleads can be granted, 
But a good hearing soothes the heart.108 
The final line—“a good hearing soothes the heart”—bears emphasis, because it 
highlights one additional consideration about the value of process. While a “good 
hearing” has the power to generate acceptance and to soothe a hurt, a bad hearing—
a poorly designed process—can do the opposite. It can create bitterness rather than 
take it away.109 That possibility increases the importance of questioning whether 
                                                                                                                 
 
as a system.”). 
 106. Burke & Leben, supra note 102, at 4 (“[1] voice, [2] neutrality, [3] respectful 
treatment, and [4] engendering trust in authorities.”); Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski 
& Nancy Spodic., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction With Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of 
Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 72 (1985); see also E. Allan Lind, 
Ruth Kanfer & Christopher P. Early, Voice, Control and Procedural Justice, 59 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990) (presenting study in which participants labeled 
outcome as more fair when they had opportunity to speak, even after being told their opinion 
would have no impact on outcome). 
 107. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 108. MASHAW, supra note 12, at vii (quoting PTTAHOTEP, supra note 12). 
 109. See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel 
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 120 (1983). Some 
studies in therapeutic jurisprudence have looked at the negative implications for the well-being 
of participants of certain dispute resolution systems. See DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990) (various procedures for 
determining fitness to stand trial may prevent recovery from mental illness); Janet Weinstein, 
And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interest of Children and the Adversary System, 52 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1999) (making case that adversary process heightens rather than soothes 
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parties who have agreed to resolve disputes by a particular process (or no process) 
have adequately taken into account the grievance-soothing power of process. 
3. Behavioral Economics and the Market for Process 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have argued that the inherent value of 
participating in a dispute resolution process, if any, can be modeled in economic 
terms as the satisfaction of a “preference for fairness.”110 Formulating the value of 
participation in this way leaves out three salient aspects of the costs of grievances 
and benefits of process just set out.  
First, the value of process comes not (or not only) from satisfaction of a preference 
but from soothing of a hurt and elimination of a negative response.111 This aspect of 
value should perhaps be modeled as the alteration, to the point of elimination, of a 
preference. Such preference-shaping effects are entirely consistent with economic 
analysis, although they do complicate matters by forcing relaxation of the static 
preferences assumption.112 
Second, the preference for fairness itself should not be viewed as constant but 
instead as a (perhaps unpredictable) function of a loss that depends on whether the loss 
is perceived to be unfair or not. The experience of a grievance (and accompanying 
formation of a strong “preference for fairness”) is stochastic, so it is not certain one 
way or the other at the time a person enters an agreement that she will suffer a grievance 
should she come to suffer a loss. As a result, the grievance-reducing value of 
participation is probabilistic; it depends on the possibility that a person will come to 
suffer a grievance and so develop a strong taste for fairness as to a loss or that dispute 
resolution process will be a soothing route for such a person. 
Third, and relatedly, the decision about how much process should be available in 
the event of a dispute necessarily takes place well before a loss (and, possibly, an 
accompanying grievance) occurs. As a result, the experienced benefit of participation 
                                                                                                                 
 
dissatisfaction of child custody disputes).  
 110. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 36. But cf. Michael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, Is There a Method to the Madness? Why Creative and Counterintuitive Proposals Are 
Counterproductive, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW & ECONOMICS 21, 28 (Mark White 
ed. 2009) (reviewing studies) (“[T]he mere lip service that is given to the taste for fairness 
within the legal economist’s typical empirical conclusions is utterly unacceptable. The taste 
for fairness is pervasive, and the preference for fairness is strong.”); Daniel Kahneman, Jack 
L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. 
285 (1986). 
 111. See supra Parts II.B.1–2. 
 112. Cf. KAPLOW AND SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 415–18 (generally approving of 
incorporating possibility of altered preferences into welfare economics, so long as change in 
preferences does make people better off). See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions 
as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in 
LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 153 (Robin Paul Malloy 
& Christopher K. Braun, eds. 1995) (“Law and economics scholars have identified various 
areas in the law . . . in which legal prohibitions and penalties are not merely intended to act as 
a price on the proscribed behavior, but are also intended to influence the underlying 
preferences of the sanctioned parties and other members of society.”). 
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in process is usually long delayed from the time that a decision is made about how 
to value participation.  
Each of these three salient features of the behavioral understanding of the value 
of process—its potentially preference-altering effect, its probabilistic value, and its 
delayed benefit—is a boundary condition for the presence of behavioral market 
failure, depending on the decision-making of the buyer. 
a. Projection Bias 
As discussed above, the inherent value of process depends in various ways on 
changed emotional states. Process is a framing device that may affect whether a 
person suffers a grievance, and it is a preference-altering commodity insofar as it can 
soothe grievances that do happen, even for those who do not ultimately prevail. 
Furthermore, the latter benefit depends on the formation of a grievance, itself a shift 
in a person’s emotional state.113 
Preference endogeneity—the tendency of some legal regimes to change peoples’ 
preferences, rather than merely satisfy them—has been identified and studied in other 
areas of the law. The most well-studied example of preference endogeneity in 
behavioral economics may be the endowment effect: the finding that in certain 
contexts the law’s assignment of an entitlement changes the way that entitlement is 
valued by its recipient.114 Another, also well-developed area of research on dynamic 
preferences is the study of the effect of law and legal institutions on the formation 
and internalization of norms.115 The acceptance-generating function of process is an 
additional way that the law may influence our preferences. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See supra, Part II.B.1. 
 114. For recent studies discussing the endowment effect, also known as reference-
dependent preferences, see, e.g., Andrea Isoni, Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, The 
Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect,” Subject 
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Comment, 101 AM. 
ECON. REV. 991 (2011); Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A 
New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935 (2008) (providing 
evolutionary explanation for endowment effect); Jack L. Knetsch & Wei-Kang Wong, The 
Endowment Effect and the Reference State: Evidence and Manipulations, 71 J. OF ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 407 (2009); Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster, Expectations as 
Endowments: Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences from Exchange and Valuation 
Experiments, 126 Q. J. ECON. 1879 (2011). But see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, 
Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and 
Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007) (questioning endowment effect). 
 115. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 490 (2006); Steffen Huck, Trust, Treason, and Trials: An Example of How 
the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven by Legal Institutions, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 44 
(1998). Cf. Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998) 
(discussing wisdom of using law to influence norms). For an in-depth study focused on the 
challenges of preference endogeneity to cost-benefit analysis, see Gregory Scott Crespi, The 
Endogeneity Problem in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 96 (2010) 
(conventional cost-benefit analyses “do not confront the difficulties involved in valuing 
policies under those circumstances when one of their consequences is a significant alteration 
of the preferences of a substantial number of people”). 
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Research in behavioral economics provides reason to doubt that people 
adequately account for future alterations in their emotional states when they make a 
decision, suffering from a decision-making quirk Loewenstein dubbed “projection 
bias.”116 Where present, projection bias “mean[s] that people wrongly project their 
current emotional state onto their future selves.”117 
A classic example of projection bias is the hungry shopper: a person who shops 
while very hungry may over-estimate her desire for food when the time comes to eat 
it because her hunger changes her preference for food and she fails to take that 
alteration into account when making a purchase decision. Another example of 
projection bias offered by Cass Sunstein is the decision to purchase a gym 
membership; people mistakenly assume at the time they enter into a gym agreement, 
usually just after the new year, that their current desire to work out will persist 
throughout the year.118 As a result, people buy expensive long-term memberships 
that they do not wind up using.  
Projection bias has not received as much focus in the legal literature as other 
behavioral phenomena like status quo bias or the endowment effect, but it has in 
limited instances been the subject of scholarly attention in behavioral law and 
economics.119 One reason for this may be that unlike other biases, it is not apparent 
how projection bias can be “nudged” away.120 None of the nudges addresses 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 1209 (“People exaggerate the degree to which 
their future tastes will resemble their current tastes. We present evidence from a variety of 
domains which demonstrates the prevalence of such projection bias.”); George Loewenstein 
& Erik Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION 351 
(Loewenstien et al., eds., 2003); cf. Daniel T. Gilbert, Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, 
Stephen J. Blumberg & Thalia P. Wheatley, Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998). 
 117. Sunstein, Willingness, supra note 17, at 323. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 324 (pointing to projection bias as one reason for a gap between willingness 
to pay and actual welfare). The primary exception is arguments about “cooling off” periods to 
prevent people from making decisions while in temporary “hot” states. See id. These “cooling 
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making until the shift in preferences has occurred. E.g. Jungmin Lee, The Impact of a 
Mandatory Cooling-Off Period on Divorce, 56 J.L. & ECON. 227 (2013). Those arguments 
apply only insofar as projection bias prevents a person in a temporary “hot” state from 
projecting a future “cold” state; they do not address failures that result from more enduring 
changes in preferences. An example of a projection-bias caused market failure resulting from 
failure to appreciate a persistent alteration in preferences that might justify a mandate is 
addiction. Laux has argued that addiction is a market failure resulting from failure of affective 
forecasting. Fritz L. Laux, Addiction as a Market Failure: Using Rational Addiction Results 
to Justify Tobacco Regulation, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 421 (2000). In this vein, John Strnad has 
argued in favor of food tax based on the view that people do not anticipate the addictive effect 
of many foods. John Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in 
Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221 (2005). Furthermore, Manuel Utset has argued 
that failure to anticipate future hot states can lead to incomplete contracting. Manuel A. Utset, 
A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of Shareholder 
Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329 (2003).  
 120. “[I]t is not clear how or whether public officials should react to the possibility of 
projection bias.” Sunstein, Willingness, supra note 17, at 324. This is so, Sunstein says, 
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projection bias as to a persistent change in emotional state that affects the value of a 
contracted-for commodity. A default rule will not stick so long as one of the parties 
to the contract has an incentive to “shift” the default, in which case that party will 
be well positioned to do so.121 Forced choice is no solution, because those subject 
to projection bias will make the wrong choice (for the reasons discussed above). 
Finally, the research that we have indicates that disclosure does not effectively 
counteract projection bias, perhaps because projection bias distorts a person’s 
understanding of their own preferences, not their belief about a question of fact 
(like optimism).122 
Furthermore, because projection bias specifically interferes with the way people 
value participation, it theoretically can justify a mandate that requires not only a 
certain degree of oversight but also participation by the aggrieved in the oversight 
mechanism. In short, the presence of projection bias can support not only a 
compliance mandate, but mandatory process. 
Theoretically, then, projection bias is a reason that parties contracting for dispute 
resolution process before a dispute has arisen could tend to underestimate the 
possibility that they might suffer a grievance and also underestimate the benefits of 
access should they do so. In such conditions, it may be “efficient,” all else being 
equal, to mandate such parties have process available should a dispute arise even if, 
left to their own devices, they would not contract for it. (Of course, any such benefit 
must be balanced against the “cost” of the mandate to parties who would not contract 
for process even if they did not suffer from projection bias, including the liberty 
“cost” of any mandate. That latter cost is reduced in the case of process mandates, as 
explained in Part III.) 
b. Optimism 
The value of process depends not only on the formation of a grievance but also the 
occurrence of a disappointing outcome. Those who are optimistic could tend to 
underestimate the likelihood that things will not go as they hope, and so underestimate 
the value of process (or any means of identifying and correcting errors).123 
                                                                                                                 
 
because “[t]he problem with projection bias is that it suggests that people will make choices 
that do not promote their welfare, as when they end up with products that they do not enjoy 
when they are using or consuming them.” Id. at 323–24. This is indeed a problem for soft 
behavioral economics and for the freedom-of-contract rationale when applied to 
preference-altering products or products whose value assumes static preferences. It is not a 
problem for hard behavioral economics, but rather a policy challenge that a carefully 
considered mandate can overcome. See infra Part III. 
 121. See Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 21 BERK. TECH. L.J. 62 (2014) 
(discussing situations under which profit-interested parties with power to do so reverse 
default rules). 
 122. See Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias, supra note 16, at 1238–39 (stating that it is 
unlikely that learning could correct projection bias). 
 123. Sternlight and Jensen include a brief discussion of the possibility of optimism, as well 
as risk-loving behavior, in the context of their analysis of the enforceability of class action 
waivers. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 75, 96–99 (2004). Dodge includes a lengthy footnote that also makes these two 
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Where optimism leads to failure in the market for process, the least 
choice-restrictive option for remedying it is a disclosure rule, not a mandate. That is 
the approach that has been taken to address failure resulting from optimism in other 
markets, like the credit card market.124 To be sure, disclosure will not always work 
as a solution to optimism, in which case a more intrusive regulatory response, such 
as a mandate, may be warranted. Indeed, recent research into the actual effectiveness 
of disclosure provides new reason to doubt its effectiveness in particular 
applications.125 
c. Hyperbolic Discounting 
A final potential behavioral market failure that may also prevent some parties 
from adequately accounting for the value of process at the time that they enter into a 
contract is hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic discounting, also referred to as 
“present bias,” is the occasional tendency demonstrated in various experimental 
studies to prioritize short-term costs and benefits over costs and benefits that will not 
accrue until later.126  
To the extent that this tendency is indeed a bias, rather than a genuine preference, 
it could prevent people from adequately assessing either the costs of grievances or 
the benefits of dispute resolution process at the time they enter a contract, just as it 
prevents efficient contracting in other contexts.127 However, the possibility that 
hyperbolic discounting reflects true (if short-sighted) preferences rather than a bias128 
makes it a problematic basis for a regulatory intervention. 
                                                                                                                 
 
suggestions. Dodge, supra note 6, at 759–60 n.139. Similarly, Baker and Lytton argue that 
optimism could lead patients to under-estimate the likelihood of doctor error, and so 
under-value their right to sue for malpractice. See Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing 
Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Medical Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and 
Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 233 (2010). For an argument noting that other-regarding 
behavior could lead patients to waive their right to sue for malpractice even when they 
otherwise would like to retain the right, and proposing a solution to that problem, see Matthew 
J.B. Lawrence, Note, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory 
Agreement: Introducing Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship Problem, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850 (2009). 
 124. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Richard H. McAdams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1607 
(2011); Maribeth Coller, Glenn W. Harrison & E. Elisabet Rutström, Are Discount Rates 
Constant? Reconciling Theory and Observation (Dec. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~harbaugh/Readings/Time/Are%20Discount%20
Rates%20Constant%20%20Reconciling%20Theory%20andObservation.pdf (showing that 
discount rate is constant but there is a “present payment” premium). 
 127. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, No Contract? (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. 
& Org., Working Paper No. 13-06, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2220271. 
 128. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 1059 (“There is neither a theoretical nor an 
empirical basis for the behaviorists’ implicit privileging of a future self.”). 
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III. PROCESS REQUIREMENTS AS CHOICE-PRESERVING MANDATES 
As discussed above, mandates are powerful medicine. The mere possibility of 
behavioral market failure does not in itself warrant a nudge, let alone a mandate. That 
is because the actual costs and benefits of a mandate can be difficult (some would 
say impossible) to quantify, especially for policymakers (or academics!) that are, of 
course, not themselves immune to behavioral bias. 
This “knowledge problem,” as Mario Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman call it, is 
not a mere roadblock for behavioral law and economics.129 Indeed it is no doubt a 
large part of the reason behavioral law and economics has, thus far, focused on 
recommending nudges, not mandates. Classical law and economics avoided the 
difficulty of not fully understanding human decision making by using simplified 
models to make recommendations with a certainty—at least within the assumptions 
of the models. Most information problems are external to these models and so did 
not directly undermine the recommendations, or at least did not until experimental 
research began to show that some of the assumptions of classical economics can 
deviate from actual human behavior in predictable ways. 
The first wave of behavioral law and economics relaxed the classical economic 
assumptions, allowing uncertainty into more realistic analyses, but made do 
notwithstanding that uncertainty by limiting its policy recommendations to “nudges,” 
such as policies (1) that feature negligible costs, as with a disclosure regime or (2) 
that are directed to areas where a policy choice is inevitable, as with the choice of a 
legal default.130 As such, this first wave was often able to make policy 
recommendations comfortably based only on evidence about the decision making of 
college students in stylized laboratory experiments, even in the face of substantial 
uncertainty about just how beneficial or effective the recommended “nudge” would 
be in the real world. And while some scholars were skeptical, policymakers were 
not; agencies at the local, state, and federal level have implemented a number of 
reforms advocated by the first wave of behavioral law and economics, sometimes 
with demonstrable success.131 
While the first wave of scholarship in behavioral economics largely circumvented 
the knowledge problem by pushing for interventions that ultimately preserve 
freedom of choice, such as disclosure requirements and default rules, not all 
behavioral market failures can be solved with nudges. As Bubb and Pildes rightly 
point out in their forthcoming article, by focusing on nudges scholars have ignored 
behavioral market failures that may be correctible only by a mandatory 
intervention.132 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New 
Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905 (2009). Jennifer Arlen may have been the first to note 
this problem for behavioral economics in an early comment. Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The 
Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAN. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1998) (“It is 
difficult to predict how, when, or whether many of these biases will manifest themselves in 
the real world.”). 
 130. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text (discussing these and other nudges). 
 131. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013). 
 132. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 21, at 1595 (“Put simply, it would be surprising if the main 
policy implications of substantial evidence documenting the failure of individual choice were 
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Hard behavioral economics of the variety Bubb and Pildes advocate does not have 
the luxury of either the internal certainty of classical law and economics or the de 
minimis costs of the regulations advocated by the first wave of behavioral law and 
economics. But process mandates have their own distinctive features that make them 
easier to justify. 
Process mandates are not purely liberty-restricting, in fact they ensure freedom of 
choice (ex post) at the same time that they take away freedom of choice (ex ante). 
This fact lowers the justificatory threshold necessary to support a process mandate 
and may help to explain their pervasive presence. (It is also a reason that other 
choice-preserving mandates—including no-fault divorce rules and prohibitions on 
liquidated damages that make it easier for a contracting party to breach—are not as 
normatively problematic as ordinary mandates.) 
To be sure, because the choice that a process mandate preserves is downstream 
from the choice that it forbids, process mandates (and other choice-preserving 
mandates) still run contrary to the assumption that parties are best positioned to know 
what will satisfy their own preferences, and so the presumption that any mandate will 
prevent efficiency-creating bargains. But that is the very rationality presumption that 
much of behavioral economic research occasionally undermines.133 As such, an 
analysis supporting (or attacking) a process mandate in a particular case, like any 
good behavioral analysis, must (1) be precise about the behavioral phenomenon at 
issue because not all departures from classical rationality actually cause market 
failure, (2) be attentive to contextual boundary conditions, (3) consider the baseline 
in deciding whether to recommend regulation, and (4) consider the possibility that 
learning might cure any behavioral market failure without intervention.134 These 
                                                                                                                 
 
a turn toward regulatory instruments that preserve individual choice.”); id. at 1601 (“We come 
not to bury [behavioral law and economics], but to push it even further.”). 
 133. See generally id. 
 134. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. 
REV. 237 (2008); Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573 
(2014). On the possibility of learning that cures biases, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006) (discussing learning and use of law to 
change biases). If people’s preferences vary predictably, then in theory people should have as 
much ability to learn that fact as policymakers. Indeed, individuals should have particularized 
insight into their own susceptibility to this effect, something policymakers can never achieve. 
Thus, it is only the possibility of projection bias that makes preference endogeneity a basis for 
regulation. For example, the thriving market for negative preference-altering products 
(addictive drugs) suggests they are something we should think carefully about regulating. Cf. 
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. 
ECON. 1261, 1285–86 (2001) (self-control model); Jonathan Gruber and Botond Koszegi, A 
Theory of Government Regulation of Addictive Bads: Optimal Tax Levels and Tax Incidence 
for Cigarette Excise Taxation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8777, Feb. 
2002) (presenting time-inconsistent preferences as justification for regulation of addictive 
drugs). On the other hand, there is no consensus that addiction indicates a departure from 
rationality, rather debate about the consistency of Becker’s rational addiction model with 
actual behavior still persists. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational 
Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 694–95 (1988); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs 
of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex-Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
1163, 1181–1223 (1998); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 
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contextual considerations are a reason that this Article does not purport to say that 
mandatory process requirements are always justified (or never are). The behavioral 
approach provides an explanation for the prevalence of process mandates in our law 
as well as a framework for deciding when process should be mandatory, but 
assessment of the desirability of a particular process mandate requires consideration 
of context, as shown in the examples provided in the next Part. 
But choice-respecting mandates do largely avoid a second objection to mandates 
often offered in support of a presumption against regulation, that is, the liberty cost 
of any mandate. To lovers of liberty, any mandatory rule comes with an inherent 
liberty cost because it deprives people of the right to make a choice, even a bad 
choice. Critics of behavioral law and economics have attacked behavioral studies for 
failing to consider this liberty cost, which they urge should create a presumption 
against regulatory intervention.135 
The liberty cost of mandates is a critical component in the debate about the 
normative desirability of whether and how to interfere in individual decision making 
(by nudge, by mandate, or not at all). The idea that nudges preserve choice (by, for 
example, leaving a regulated party the opportunity to opt out of a default rule) was 
the key move that broke open the first wave of soft normative behavioral economic 
analysis, associated with “libertarian paternalism” and “asymmetric paternalism.”136 
Additionally, the liberty cost of mandates and nudges is a load-bearing aspect of 
the argument of those who say that because of the knowledge problem, policymakers 
should not employ behavioral market failure as a justification for regulation.137 That 
is because the knowledge problem does not actually counsel for or against regulation, 
it says only that it is difficult for policymakers to know the true effect of regulation. 
In order to use this insight as an argument against regulation, proponents rely on a 
presumption against restricting choice on the ground that come what may, laws that 
interfere with choice pose liberty costs.138 This approach makes sense; if we are 
uncertain about most costs and benefits of an intervention, but certain of one cost, it 
follows naturally that we should err against the intervention. 
This is why it is important that process mandates and other choice-respecting 
mandates do not pose as great a liberty cost as ordinary mandates. While a process 
mandate deprives both parties of a choice ex ante, namely, the choice to waive (or 
otherwise specify) process, it does so while giving one of the affected parties a choice 
she would not otherwise have had ex post, namely, the right to air her grievance. As 
such, a process mandate is not as purely liberty restricting as, for example, a ban on 
cigarette smoking or mandate that people save for retirement. Indeed, a process 
mandate may seem more liberty enhancing than the alternative to a customer or 
patient or employee who is reminded at the time of suit, after suffering a grievance, 
that she has agreed in advance with the seller or insurer or employer that she has 
grown to loathe that she would not sue, or could sue only in the forum and through 
the process designed by her opponent. (The seller or insurer or employer, of course, 
will take the opposite view). 
                                                                                                                 
 
(1992); ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF SMOKING (1992). 
 135. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 42. 
 136. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 21, at 1604. 
 137. E.g. Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 129. 
 138. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 1062–67. 
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Furthermore, the normative case for already-extant process mandates is even 
stronger. Process mandates already pervade the law and often become the subject of 
controversy only when scholars employing the classical economic approach 
advocate they be rescinded.139 Against a baseline of mandatory process, which may 
itself be adaptive, the mere possibility of behavioral market failure cuts against the 
certainty of arguments that employ the rationality assumptions of classical economic 
analysis.140 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The behavioral approach to mandatory process should be taken into account 
anytime policymakers decide whether to mandate process, eliminate an existing 
mandate, or decide how much process to mandate. This Part demonstrates the 
operation of the behavioral approach as to four specific process policy questions. 
Subpart A discusses how the behavioral approach can be used to defend the ACA’s 
process mandate. Subpart B discusses implications for agreements to alter the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, currently the subject of active scholarly debate. 
Subpart C offers implications for an open question of constitutional law, specifically, 
the question whether claimants to government benefits may waive their right to 
process “due” under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. Subpart D shows how the explanation offered here can point out not 
just where a process mandate is justified, but where one is not. 
A. Explaining the Affordable Care Act’s Process Mandate 
The Obama Administration has famously embraced the “asymmetrically 
paternalistic” approach to regulation advocated by Cass Sunstein, Christine Jolls, and 
others, enacting numerous regulations that only “nudge” people to behave in a 
particular way while leaving the ultimate choice to them. But the Administration’s 
signature legislative enactment, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
famously takes a different approach. The ACA does not nudge, it shoves. 
The ACA’s most famous mandates, so far, are the requirement that uninsured 
individuals obtain health insurance, the “individual mandate”; the requirement that 
all insurance plans include coverage for contraceptive services, the “contraception 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Consider, for example, the controversy surrounding Richard Epstein’s suggestion that 
parties be allowed to contract out of the malpractice system. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical 
Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976); see also Lawrence, 
supra note 123, at 851 (“Scholars of law and economics have long contemplated versions of 
[Epstein’s] proposal, although currently there is no uniform endorsement of the idea.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 140. This insight is a specific application of the more general point that it is easier to use 
behavioral economics to support “anti-antipaternalism”—here, to doubt the freedom-of-contract 
rationale as a basis for restricting extant process mandates—than it is to use behavioral economics 
to support outright paternalism. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998) (“[B]ounded 
rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism, but 
not an affirmative defense of paternalism.”). 
2015] MANDATORY PROCESS 1461 
 
mandate”; and the requirement that employers provide subsidized health insurance 
to their full-time employees, the “employer mandate.” The bases for and wisdom of 
these mandates has been the subject of extensive popular and scholarly attention. 
The health reform law contains a fourth mandate that has not received the same 
level of attention, yet. The law mandates the procedural rights that must be made 
available as part of health insurance coverage decision making. 
“One of the most important consumer protections” in a law that doubles down on 
insurer-administered healthcare, this process mandate says that even purely private 
health insurers must offer their beneficiaries the opportunity to challenge decisions 
denying healthcare coverage claims all the way to an “independent” external 
reviewer.141 The reform is a significant one. In 2013 alone, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services expected more people to air their grievances through this 
dispute resolution process than to file civil lawsuits of any kind in federal court.142 
And this process mandate is likely to grow in importance as the need to curb growing 
healthcare costs presses insurers to ration coverage more explicitly.143 
Why mandate a process to govern review of health plan coverage decisions rather 
than leave such choices to freedom of contract? The forgoing analysis presents an 
explanation. At the time a beneficiary shops for insurance, the possibility of needing 
coverage for a particular treatment of service is far off; the possibility of such needed 
coverage being denied will seem more remote still. Furthermore, if projection bias 
causes the beneficiary to assume static emotional states, then she will not anticipate 
that a denial of coverage could cause her particular emotional harm (separate from 
the financial loss), and so will not anticipate that participating in a dispute resolution 
process could soothe such a grievance. And beyond projection bias, a beneficiary 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The Appeals Process Amended Rule, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS (June 23, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/06/23/implementing-health
-reform-the-appeals-process-amended-rule/; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 142. Compare Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43328, 43343 tbl.2 (July 23, 2010) 
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 143. See M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH 10 (2011) (“Medicine’s therapeutic 
potential is surpassing our ability to pay for it. . . . We will ration care.”); see also ROBERT P. 
RHODES, HEALTH CARE POLITICS, POLICY, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: THE IRONIC TRIUMPH 
14 (1992) (“No more can we explain death and suffering as a consequence of fate. It is our 
medicine, or lack of it, that denies death and suffering. We know we must choose who receives 
scarce resources and who does not. No longer can we attribute to fate or to God the 
responsibility for making life-and-death decisions. . . . These new choices challenge our basic 
values and frequently produce conflict.”); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Charles C. Griffin, & Caitlin 
E. Carroll, U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical Development and Choices for 
the 1990s, 21 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 150 (1993) (“Medical ‘need’ was once thought to set 
a natural limit on services; in fact, ‘need’ is an expansive, not a limiting concept.”). 
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might be optimistic about the likelihood of being denied coverage, which would also 
cause her to underappreciate the value of an appeal right. 
To be sure, this is all supposition; we do not have data on either the benefit a 
claimant gets from challenging an insurance coverage denial or of beneficiaries’ 
actual susceptibility to projection bias. Here is where the “knowledge problem” 
usually proves fatal for mandates144; where we are unsure about the presence of a 
behavioral market failure, the fact that mandates limit choice counsels against their 
adoption. But as discussed in Part III, that argument does not have the same force in 
this context. 
The prevalence of process mandates throughout the law and the fact that a process 
mandate actually promotes choice for the beneficiary ex post (by giving her the option 
to appeal) even while limiting her options ex ante (by taking away her option to forego 
a right to appeal) undercuts the force of the freedom-of-contract presumption. If one 
views the former choice (the option to appeal) to be as meaningful as the latter (the 
option to waive the right to appeal), it is not clear which way the intrinsic value of 
liberty cuts, making the ACA’s choice to mandate process for plan beneficiaries 
defensible in light of the mere possibility of projection bias. Indeed, the anguished 
reaction of patients and courts to the former (no process) state of affairs indicates that 
the option to appeal is indeed an especially significant choice.145 
B. Contracting Around the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
In the past several years, a vibrant literature has explored whether and when 
federal courts should permit parties to alter, by agreement, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.146 The ultimate approach that courts take to answer this question could 
have substantial implications for the administration of civil justice in the United 
States. Excellent surveys of the growing importance of this practice and the scholarly 
debate surrounding it are put forward by Davis and Hershkoff, Bone, and Dodge.147 
The behavioral approach to mandatory process offered above has significant 
implications for this issue. 
First, the possibility that projection bias could lead parties to undervalue their day 
in court provides an independent reason to be concerned about agreements to alter 
procedural rules that affect the perceived fairness of civil process. At the same time, 
it provides reason to be sanguine about rules that force participation in programs 
intended to do nothing more than air (and thereby soothe) grievances, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See supra Part III. 
 145. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 146. E.g., Robert G. Bone, supra note 6, at 1333 n.21, 1334 nn.22–23(collecting sources 
pro and con contracts to alter the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); id. at 1342–52 (discussing 
current law on enforcement of agreements to alter rules of procedure in federal and state court); 
Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 527; Dodge, supra note 6, at 734–38 (discussing 
enforcement of procedural contracts in federal court); Resnik, supra note 6, at 613; Taylor 
& Cliffe, supra note 60, at 1098–1105 (arguing that Rules Enabling Act prohibits judicial 
enforcement of contractual alterations to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
 147. See Bone, supra note 6; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 6; Dodge, supra note 6. 
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requirements that parties participate in mediation before hearing their dispute in court, 
even if the parties do not think in advance that mediation will be worth the effort.148 
Contracts altering rules of civil procedure that affect the grievance-soothing 
functions of process—the “day in court”—are especially suspect due to the 
possibility of behavioral market failure preventing one or both parties from 
adequately assessing this value ex ante. This concern augments the classical 
economic concerns discussed in Part II.A.1, as well as the federal court-specific 
concerns discussed in Parts II.A.2(c) and (d), providing a reason to refuse 
enforcement even when those concerns are absent and bolstering the case against 
enforcement when they are present. 
Research into procedural justice indicates particular rules that should be 
especially resistant to contractual alteration. The first are those rules that affect access 
to an in-person hearing, because of the importance of that right to the 
acceptance-generating power of process.149 This obviously implicates procedural 
changes that take away this right directly, like an agreement waiving the right to trial 
by jury, or an agreement to appear by telephone. It also implicates agreements that 
make an in-person hearing practically more difficult, such as forum selection clauses 
that force a plaintiff to litigate in a distant forum. 
Another category of rules of civil procedure that the behavioral approach indicates 
should be especially resistant to contractual alteration are those that affect the quality 
of cases a plaintiff may bring. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
governs pleading, is the most apparent example of such a rule.150 Agreements 
altering the filing fee schedule are also suspect under the behavioral approach, as are 
agreements limiting the availability of discovery during the pendency of a motion to 
dismiss (perhaps by providing for an automatic stay).151 (Such an agreement limits 
access insofar as discovery during the pendency of the motion could, due to the 
possibility of amendment, make the pleading threshold easier to meet.) While 
efficiency may dictate that losing cases be weeded out, the behavioral approach 
indicates that there is value even to giving a losing plaintiff his day in court and that 
plaintiffs will tend to underestimate that value before a dispute arises. 
Second, as a general matter, the behavioral approach counsels in favor of an 
across-the-board prohibition on all agreements to alter rules that implicate the 
grievance-soothing functions of process.152 By adding an additional 
context-dependent reason to doubt, in a particular case, that parties’ contracts to alter 
such Federal Rules are in fact in the parties’ interest, the behavioral approach 
ultimately counsels in favor of a uniform rule against enforcement. Coupled with 
other context-dependent inquiries, such as the inquiry into whether enforcement of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See Ettie Ward, Mandatory Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United 
States Federal Courts: Panacea or Pandemic?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 77, 78–79 (2007). 
 149. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 150. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 557 (2007) 
(interpreting pleading standard of Rule 8 to weed out implausible suits). 
 151. See generally Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions 
to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (2012) (in 
many districts discovery automatically proceeds during pendency of motion to dismiss). 
 152. To the extent possible, such a blanket prohibition might include a carveout for suits 
between two corporate entities. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
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the contract would undermine the underlying substantive law envisioned by Dodge, 
and the inquiry into whether enforcement would undermine other purposes of the 
federal courts envisioned by  Davis and Hershkoff, the “cost” of adjudicating whether 
to enforce particular procedural contracts could easily outweigh any benefit that a 
case-by-case approach would have over a uniform prohibition.153 That is, the more 
that must be considered in order to apply a standard, the more attractive a rule begins 
to look. This concern is heightened in designing a set of adjudicatory procedures 
whose very purpose is uniformity.154  
In sum, the behavioral approach has important implications for civil procedure. It 
counsels against enforcement of predispute agreements altering rules that limit a 
claimant’s right to an actual hearing, such as forum selection clauses, as well as 
agreements that limit a claimant’s right to come to court in the first place, provided 
in the pleading standard of Federal Rule 8 and elsewhere. 
C. Due Process: Nudge or Mandate? 
The most famous process mandate in American law is surely the Fifth 
Amendment’s instruction that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”155 But even due process is not always 
mandatory process. In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has treated the Due 
Process Clause as a mere nudge, a default rule subject to opt out. In others, the Court 
has not yet decided whether the clause mandates or nudges due process. In such cases 
the behavioral approach is illuminating. 
To crystallize the discussion, a hypothetical: Mashaw’s prominent study of the 
administration of social security disability suggests that much of the energy spent on 
administrative appeals could be better spent on getting initial decisions right.156 
Assuming policymakers agreed in a particular case, could they offer participants the 
choice of opting out of the default, due-process-required administrative appeal 
system ex ante, and into a system in which the resources that would have been spent 
on due process are poured into getting decisions right in the first instance? Or even 
a system in which the resources saved by not operating the administrative appeals 
mechanism are poured into extra benefits for those who opt out? Given the massive 
transaction costs of operating entitlement appeals systems in social security, 
Medicare, veterans’ benefits, and elsewhere, this hypothetical is not so farfetched. 
The constitutionality of a predispute opt-out administrative process regime 
governing such a “new property” entitlement157 subject to due process protections 
would implicate two potentially conflicting lines of Supreme Court precedent. In a 
series of cases beginning with M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. See generally Lawrence, supra note 88 (discussing choice between rule and standard 
in designing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); cf. Bone, supra note 6 (expressing doubt that 
costs and benefits of procedural contracts can be measured and weighed). 
 154. Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 60, at 1100–04. But see Bone, supra note 6, at 1371 
(rejecting uniformity argument against contractual deviations from the Federal Rules). 
 155. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 156. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1985); see also ELEANOR D. KINNEY, 
PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS (2002) (building on Mashaw’s analysis). 
 157. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964). 
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Court held that the due process protections offered to litigants prior to entry of a civil 
judgment may be waived ex ante, before a dispute has arisen.158 Indeed, in Overmyer 
Co. Inc. v. Frick Co., the Court found due process was not violated by a cognovits 
note, by which a debtor agreed in advance that her creditors’ attorney could agree to 
a civil judgment on her behalf.159 This is why an arbitration need not follow all the 
procedures that due process requires be available in federal court in order to produce 
an enforceable judgment against the defendant. 
On the other hand, in addressing specifically the procedural protections that must 
be available when the government alters or withdraws an entitlement, the Supreme 
Court has rejected the theory that claimants can be asked to accept the “bitter with 
the sweet,” that is, that subconstitutional procedures are permissible when they are 
provided for in the law that creates the initial entitlement. As the Court put it in 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill: “The right to due process is conferred, not by 
legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not 
to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally 
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate 
procedural safeguards.”160 
An opt-out regime conditioning access to a better administrative process or to 
enhanced benefits would not conflict with this precise holding, because the alteration 
to the constitutionally created safeguards would come by contractual agreement, not 
legislative mandate. But it would conflict with the spirit of Loudermill insofar as the 
reasoning that the content of “due process” is to be determined by the Court in 
interpreting the Constitution precludes contractual as well as legislative alteration. 
How should this question of law be resolved? Lower courts that have addressed 
predispute agreements to go without the protections of due process have held them 
to be enforceable on freedom-of-contract grounds.161 Furthermore, scholars have 
suggested that an opt-out administrative regime should be constitutionally 
permissible, again seeing “no obvious injustice or arbitrariness in holding the 
individual bound by the procedural strings that were voluntarily accepted.”162 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 159. 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972) (holding the cognovits note was enforceable). The Court 
did reserve the question whether cognovits notes would be enforceable in other situations. Id. 
at 188 (“Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts of other cases. For 
example, where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining 
power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal 
consequences may ensue.”); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94–96 (1972) (holding 
that the waiver was facially invalid in adhesive consumer contract). 
 160. 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
 161. See Gorham v. City of Kansas City, 590 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Kan. 1979) (holding that 
union could waive due process rights through collective bargaining agreement so long as 
replacement procedures were “fair, reasonable, and efficacious”); Antinore v. State, 371 
N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921 (1976) (enforcing collective 
bargaining agreement that limited due process rights). Cf. Murphy v. Wack, No. 89 Civ. 3300, 
1991 WL 64193, at *5 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1991) (wondering whether Antinore is still good 
law after Loudermill). 
 162. Rodney M. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 111 (1982) 
1466 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1429 
 
behavioral approach shows that the case for allowing opt-out of due process prior to 
the formation of a dispute is not so straightforward. 
Whether an agreement to opt-out of procedural due process protections before a 
dispute has arisen should be constitutional is a different question than the one the 
behavioral approach addresses, that is, whether the law should approve of such an 
agreement simply as a matter of policy on the basis of the freedom-of-contract 
assumption that doing so would be welfare enhancing. In particular, the 
constitutional question might implicate questions about original intent (if you are an 
originalist); about the interpretation of precedent (we are all precedentialists); and 
about the design of constitutional rules (which are difficult to tailor case by case). 
However, the scholars and courts that have approved of the constitutionality of 
such agreements have focused only on the freedom-of-contract rationale as a reason 
to do so. Here, the behavioral approach offers a rebuttal. Even an agreement made 
knowingly, without any imbalance in bargaining power, may reflect the behavioral 
biases discussed in Part II.B—projection bias and also optimism or hyperbolic 
discounting—that could lead the would-be claimant to undervalue her right to 
process. While Laurence Tribe asked “why should a would-be government employee 
. . . not be permitted to waive procedural protections” ex ante,163 these behavioral 
considerations provide an answer: because she may undervalue her right to a “day in 
court” when entering into such an agreement. In light of the constitutional gravity of 
the issue, such ex ante waivers should not be enforced absent assurance that the 
claimant was not subject to projection bias. (In the case of a corporate claimant this 
may not be difficult to acquire, see infra Part IV.D, but in the case of an ordinary, 
mortal applicant for benefits it may be far more difficult.) 
                                                                                                                 
 
(“[W]hen the contractual relationship between the state and the individual is free of such 
coercive taint, there is no obvious injustice or arbitrariness in holding the individual bound by 
the procedural strings that were voluntarily accepted. Some rights may be inalienable in some 
situations, just as some bargains are illegal despite mutual and uncoerced assent; but as long 
as courts retain their normal power to police bargains and carefully scrutinize the contractual 
process, the lack of meaningful procedural recourse for an individual can surely be the 
legitimate object of an enforceable bargain.”) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 114 (“If 
the validity of the condition turns on balancing the government interest against the individual 
right involved, there is nothing wrong with ‘devaluing’ the individual interest when it is 
voluntarily bartered for a benefit.”); id. (“[T]o the extent that concerns for individual dignity 
create a need for due process norms as ends in themselves, those dignity interests are 
legitimately devalued when abrupt procedure is voluntarily accepted.”); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 280 n.37 (1975) (“Absent some 
notion of great bargaining inequality, why should a would-be government employee, or a 
would-be debtor, not be permitted to waive procedural protections in return for benefits each 
would rather enjoy in hybrid form than not at all?”) (emphasis in original); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 305, 374 (2001) (“[T]he 
recipient of a government benefit may be deemed to have waived due process rights as part of 
the bargaining process by which the benefit was obtained.”). 
 163. Tribe, supra note 162, at 280 n.37 (emphasis omitted). 
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D. Mandate Unjustified: Insurers’ Contracts with Medicare 
The behavioral approach is especially essential to informed analysis of process 
policy in areas where policymakers are tasked with deciding whether the law should 
mandate process where it previously did not do so. That is, because unlike reliance 
on a single deontological view or potential externality, the behavioral approach is 
capable of doing more than just defending existing process mandates; when neither 
projection bias nor any of the justifications discussed in Part II.A are present, the 
behavioral approach counsels against a process mandate. Such questions are 
especially common and important in the increasingly regulated tenth of the economy 
related to healthcare, as illustrated in Part IV.A, and this Section points to another 
such application: private insurers’ contracts with the federal government to 
administer Medicare or operate on the Affordable Care Act’s exchanges. 
The United States government is very much in the business of healthcare 
coverage. The ACA amplified that role.164 Rather than displace the market for 
healthcare with a single-payer system, the ACA expanded that market—mandating 
demand—while simultaneously increasing the surveillance role of government in the 
marketplace.165 In an effort to tame healthcare, an industry that is perceived to be 
unique, the invisible hand of the market has been partnered with the red, white, and 
blue one of Uncle Sam. 
This public-private partnership is evident even in the design of original Medicare, 
the first-enacted federally subsidized insurance program for the elderly and 
disabled.166 Medicare Parts A and B—original Medicare—are nominally “single 
payer,” in the sense that the government directly pays for medical services provided 
to beneficiaries.167 They are actually operated, however, by third-party contractors, 
often working for a profit, who are hired by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services to run Medicare on its behalf.168 And, of course, providers and device 
manufacturers do not work for the government; they remain in the private sector and 
agree to serve Medicare beneficiaries only because they are paid to do so.169 
The private role in public healthcare is even more pronounced in the more recent 
additions to government-subsidized healthcare, Medicare Parts C and D.170 There, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1611 (2011) (discussing 
minimum coverage requirements and other ACA initiatives to regulate private insurance). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 
101 GEO. L.J. 519 (2013). 
 167. Id. at 530. 
 168. Id. at 527. 
 169. See id. 
 170. In Medicare Part C, Medicare beneficiaries opt to put their Medicare premium dollars 
toward privately-administered health insurance, rather than participate in the federally run 
Medicare program. Insurers who accept Medicare Part C beneficiaries enter into agreements 
with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services that govern the terms of their plans, but 
benefit not only by having access to a wider customer base, but also by receiving risk sharing 
and other subsidies from the taxpayers. 
In Medicare Part D—the Medicare prescription drug program—Medicare formally 
contracts with insurers, known as “Part D sponsors,” to provide coverage to Medicare 
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the government is not actually the payer, from the perspective of either the 
beneficiary or the provider. Instead, private nonprofit and for-profit insurers provide 
coverage to beneficiaries in these components, with the government subsidizing and 
regulating that coverage on the back end through contractual and quasi-contractual 
agreements with the participating insurers.171 
The public-private partnership continues in the ACA. Under the Act, the 
government increased demand for coverage in the individual market by mandating 
individuals buy health insurance that covers certain benefits. At the same time, the 
Act tasks state and federal governments with creating and administering an exchange 
marketplace in which such plans are bought and sold, and entitles participating 
insurers to government-subsidized (i.e., taxpayer-subsidized) and administered risk 
protection through the risk corridors and cost sharing.172 As in Medicare, the insurers 
that choose to participate in the government-run marketplace created by the ACA get 
the benefit of increased revenues resulting from government subsidies, but must be 
willing to subject themselves to heightened government control.173 So far, some 
insurers have thought that tradeoff worth it, while others have not.174 
Disputes between the government and such insurers that choose to do business 
with it in the medical marketplace are inevitable. One common sort of dispute arises 
out of the myriad payment determinations that the government must make—in 
Medicare Parts A, B, C, and D—as well as in operating on the ACA’s exchanges. In 
each area, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the responsible 
division of the Department of Health and Human Services, must calculate the 
payments owed to particular providers, insurers, and hospitals.175 (The CMS will first 
do this as to participants in the ACA’s exchanges in early 2015, after the 2014 plan 
year is concluded.) This amounts to millions of individualized calculations each year; 
forming the fodder for as many disputes as there are contracting insurers and providers. 
In many of these areas, the legal right to ex post dispute resolution process 
afforded to entities that do business with the government remains undetermined. In 
the areas where this question has been resolved, however, the law has generally 
mandated that the private nonprofit and for-profit entities that do business with the 
government have available the same process for resolving disputes with the 
government—including case by case adjudication in federal court—that is made 
available to Medicare beneficiaries, or to citizens aggrieved by agency action 
                                                                                                                 
 
beneficiaries at great reduced cost. The Part D contracts these sponsors enter into with the 
HHS set the premiums they will charge, the reimbursement they will receive from the 
government, the distribution of risk between the insurer and the government, and so on. 
 171. See Bagley, supra note 166, at 527.  
 172. See 42 U.S.C. § 18061 (2012) (Transitional reinsurance); 42 U.S.C. § 18062 (2012) 
(Risk corridors calendar years 2014, 2015, 2016); 42 U.S.C. § 18063 (2012) (Risk adjustment). 
 173. See Baker, supra note 164, at 1611–12 (discussing exchange participation). 
 174. See Leemore Dafny, Jonathan Gruber & Christopher Ody, More Insurers Lower 
Premiums: Evidences from Initial Pricing in the Health Insurance Marketplaces (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ Research, Working Paper No. 20140, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org
/papers/w20140. 
 175. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Amendments to the HHS Notice of 
Benefit and Payment Parameters 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,541, 15,543 (Mar. 11, 2014) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 153, 156) (describing method for calculating subsidies). 
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generally.176 This is so notwithstanding the possibility that these entities might freely 
enter business with the government even if no such process were available. This can 
be because of either statutory or regulatory requirements, and sometimes is the 
product of the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action applied 
by courts.177 Indeed, in some cases insurers are entitled to more dispute resolution 
process than is offered to individual beneficiaries.178 
The law mandates dispute resolution in this domain reflexively, assuming that 
entities that voluntarily do business with the government to administer healthcare 
should have access to the same dispute resolution process that statutes and 
regulations currently make mandatory for Medicare beneficiaries or other individuals 
aggrieved by nonconsensual agency action. But the behavioral approach shows that 
this assumption is unfounded. 
Unlike beneficiaries, insurance companies are rational actors with one static 
preference, namely, wealth maximization. As such, dispute resolution process serves 
a diminished grievance-reducing function vis-a-vis insurers that contract with the 
government to administer Medicare benefits, as explained in Part I. As to such firms, 
mandatory dispute resolution process can be justified only by either its 
error-reducing functions or a deontological preference for a system in which process 
is available in such situations. Both justifications are unpersuasive in this context, as 
explained in Parts II and III. 
1. Corporate Grievances? 
Insurance companies are rational wealth maximizers. There is no reason to believe 
that insurers suffer the costs of grievances discussed above, and so no reason to 
believe dispute resolution serves a grievance-reducing function vis-a-vis these 
entities. Insurers do not grieve. True, insurers’ employees may grieve, and may even 
benefit personally when the firm has its day in court. But the shareholders of 
publically traded corporations, at least, would presumably not want such employee 
grudges to influence the insurer’s behavior. 
2. Error Reduction and Medicare Payment Appeals 
While grievance reduction is a function that dispute resolution process is uniquely 
capable of providing, error reduction is not. In many contexts, including the 
calculation of payments to insurers, the goal of error reduction can be more 
efficiently obtained by other means, such as greater investment in accuracy ex ante 
or auditing and random sampling by a neutral third party. As a result, dispute 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. See Fox Ins. Co. v. Ctrs. Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1217–19 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (describing procedural rights afforded terminated Part D insurer); cf. Nicholas 
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insurer). 
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resolution process should not be presumptively available in these areas if the insurers 
would be willing to go without. 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has already tentatively come to 
this conclusion in a very limited area, by providing that hospitals have no right to 
challenge the decision to reopen payment determinations (although they do have the 
right to challenge the decision made on reopening).179 When challenged, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld this policy, noting and deferring to the CMS’s determination that ex 
ante auditing of recovery audit contractors—the entities that make reopening 
determinations—was a superior means of error prevention than a claimant-driven 
dispute resolution process.180 The argument of this section is that the CMS was right 
in that case, and that it should explore limiting provider and insurer rights to judicial 
review of individualized determinations in other areas. 
There are three reasons to doubt the superiority of dispute resolution process as a 
tool of error reduction in paying Medicare contractors. First, dispute resolution in 
this context is a biased error reducer. Because companies only appeal errors that hurt 
them, false positives are never identified through the dispute resolution process. 
(Note that this bias could also be corrected by giving some entity the incentive and 
ability to discover and challenge through the dispute resolution process payment 
errors in favor of providers or insurers, but such a rule could create its own problems, 
as seen in the Recovery Audit Contractor program that has recently been the subject 
of controversy in the Medicare Part A context.)181 
Second, dispute resolution is a costly means of error identification and 
correction.182 Third, because the government processes a high volume of Medicare 
payment claims each year (and will process a high volume of claims from insurers 
participating on the exchanges), a certain number of errors is not only inevitable but 
desirable.183 Unlike other tools of error reduction, such as auditing, dispute resolution 
process is not capable of error tolerance; it looks at determinations one at a time, and 
so provides a costly route by which even otherwise desirable errors are identified and 
corrected. Whether error reduction is ever most cost-effectively accomplished by 
hearings in Medicare is beyond the scope of this Article. But the preceding discussion 
offers reason for doubt. Wherever policymakers conclude that other means would be 
more cost-effective, they should consider conditioning participation in Medicare on 
a company’s agreement to be subject to such means. 
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3. Deontological Justifications 
Deontological justifications for dispute resolution process have diminished 
applicability to businesses that administer Medicare. If a business entity would be 
willing to attempt to earn a profit by assisting in the provision of 
government-subsidized healthcare whether or not they are afforded a right to ex post 
dispute resolution process, then why should such a right be afforded if it does not 
serve consequentialist ends? 
This question is especially pronounced in the Medicare Part D context, where 
insurers compete to serve in the program by submitting premium bids to the 
government. Companies could incorporate the lost “value” of dispute resolution 
process in their premium bids, and those companies that did not value such process 
would have a competitive advantage. Such an arrangement would be a contrast to the 
current approach, which automatically gives all companies a right to dispute 
resolution process, benefitting those companies that are able to extract the most value 
out of the taxpayers through use of that process. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered an improved understanding of the value of process and, 
with it, a new explanation of when procedural rules should be made mandatory. 
Specifically, it has shown that people might fail to appreciate the potential value of 
a “day in court,” either by failing to anticipate that they may be bitterly disappointed 
by a potential outcome or by failing to anticipate that simply being heard could 
soothe that disappointment. Because laws making procedural rules mandatory are 
not as liberty-restricting as more run-of-the-mill mandates—they leave one party a 
meaningful choice ex post that he might otherwise have mistakenly given away ex 
ante—the possibility of such market failure makes process mandates justifiable in a 
wider range of contexts than more ordinary mandates. 
  

